

THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

THE LAMBETH REPORT—FIRST IMPRESSIONS

THESE paragraphs must inevitably be written within a few days of the receipt of the Lambeth Conference Report;* and they cannot do more, therefore, than represent our first reflections upon its contents. As we announced last month, the various sections of the Report will be discussed by a number of competent writers in subsequent issues of THEOLOGY; but we believe that our readers would wish us to open up some lines of thought and enquiry on the subject in the meantime. We shall probably best do this by taking its various sections *seriatim*, and making some comment upon each. We feel all the more able to do this as the Bishop of London's article, which we publish below, gives so vivid a sense of the atmosphere of the Conference as a whole.

I. THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD

The passage in the Encyclical Letter dealing with this, the first subject on the agenda, gives a faithful reflection of the profound and illuminating Report presented by the Committee over which the Archbishop of Armagh presided. No higher praise could be bestowed upon the treatment of the doctrine of God than to say that it is both conceived and expressed in the spirit of mingled theology and worship which we associate with the writings of William Law. The treatment is synthetic in the fullest sense of the word; the Old Testament is given its true place in the scheme of Revelation; due note is taken of the spiritual witness implied in much modern science, while some of the fallacious notions derived from it are briefly, but effectively, dismissed; and emphasis is laid on the need of study and the obligation of worship. In the Resolutions these points are

* Lambeth Conference, 1930. Encyclical Letter from the Bishops with the Resolutions and Reports. S.P.C.K., paper 2s. 6d. net, cloth 3s. 6d.

brought out in greater detail, and various suggestions made for the better fulfilment of the teaching office of the Church. The ideas are excellent, and suggest that learning is not to be quite the Cinderella of the Church's life that it has been. It will be interesting to see whether anything comes of them.

II. THE LIFE AND WITNESS OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

We propose to confine our remarks on this section to that part of it which treats of Marriage and Sex, since we conceive that our readers will find this part more perplexing than anything else in the Report. We are not thinking of the outbursts on the subject in certain organs of the daily or Sunday press, which can be ignored. Whatever the Bishops had said, they would have got a bad press in these quarters. We are reminded of our Lord's words about "the children in the market-place" (Matt. xi. 16-19), who reviled the humanism of Christ no less than the rigorism of John the Baptist. What the Church has got to aim at is that wisdom should be justified of her children. The effect of the Bishops' action on the Church is of far greater importance than its effect on the world. This is not to say that the procedure by which the decision has been reached is satisfactory: to grieve tender consciences on the one hand, and on the other to cause elation to those who have no consciences at all, can never be satisfactory. It may, however, be sometimes inevitable. In any case, the procedure conditioning the decision and the decision itself are to be distinguished; and no one who realizes the extreme difficulty of the Bishops' task in virtually reversing their own previous findings on the subject will wish to indulge in any captious criticism.

The Resolution on birth control, and the two immediately preceding resolutions, are of great importance. The Conference has here definitely departed from the traditional condemnation in all circumstances of methods of controlling conception other than abstinence from intercourse; and it has done so presumably in view (1) of the advance in knowledge, especially of psychology; (2) of the change of medical opinion since the Lambeth Conference of 1920; and not least (3) of the representations made to them by confessors and others of strongly Catholic proclivities who have found the Resolution of 1920 too narrow a basis on which to give guidance to the faithful. The departure from tradition is quite definite. It is not a case even of a refusal to condemn or to judge. The purpose of procreation and the importance of self-control are held to be governing considerations in regard to intercourse; and when procreation

would be wrong, abstinence is held to be the "primary and obvious" method of avoiding conception, in that other methods may only be adopted when there is "a morally sound reason for avoiding complete abstinence." But it is implied quite clearly that such reasons may exist and, if such a reason does exist, "the Conference agrees that other methods may be used." There follow (1) the important proviso that they must be used in accordance with Christian principles (*i.e.*, not merely for sensual pleasure, and subject to self-control and temperance), and (2) a strong and very necessary condemnation of their use from motives of "selfishness, luxury, or mere convenience."

We believe that the Conference was bound to give some guidance on the subject, and we agree with what we conceive to be the guidance it aimed at giving. At the same time the form of the treatment of the subject seems to us open to strong criticism. In the first place there are marked inconsistencies between the Committee's report and the Resolutions; and, though the former is not authoritative, this is precisely one of those cases where a just respect for the dignity of the Church as the moral guide of men called for the utmost care in securing agreement. The result is an impression of inexpertness, which is most unfortunate. In the second place we think that more should have been said as to the "Christian principles" in accordance with which the question is to be decided. Does the Conference mean that abstinence is the "primary" method in the sense that it is to be tried first, and that other methods are a matter for casuistry, if that fails? On the whole, we think that that is what the Conference does mean: but why should it not have been said? It would have given far more confidence than any allusions to "clearly-felt" obligations, with all that the phrase portends of subjectivism. And, thirdly, we consider that the situation called for a far more searching and direct denunciation of the selfish, timid, and trivial reasons for which birth-control is today being widely practised.

All this means, however, that, if wisdom is to be justified of her children, great importance will attach to the attitude and teaching of the clergy on this subject; and we propose to indicate briefly what our own line as a parish priest will be. We may sum it up under three heads:

1. Our people should be urged to buy the Report and read it. Some of our lay-folk, especially perhaps men, are seriously distressed at what they have read in the papers; and a perusal of the whole Report will at least enable them to see the proportions in which the whole subject of sexual relations is

handled. They will realize, for example, that the Church has definitely moved away from the philosophy of life which regarded sex as something to be tabooed, to one which places it among the God-given faculties and opportunities of life. In an adulterous generation like our own the move was dangerous; but the risk was one which in principle our Lord Himself took.

2. Attention should be drawn to the fact that it is by virtue of this philosophy that selfishness, improper propaganda, and pre-nuptial unchastity are condemned. [It may be observed that the last-named raises a variety of issues, familiar to every country parson, which are not dealt with in this Report.] And at the same time the place of self-discipline within the married state is strongly emphasized—a point which should be interpreted as covering the delicate consideration between husband and wife which must govern all conjugal intercourse, and also as suggesting the observance of certain seasons by deliberate abstinence.

3. We think that the clergy should be careful not to allude to the subject of Resolution 15 in the pulpit, following in this matter the practice of the Encyclical. But we should try to get our people to realize that married life raises a number of practical moral problems of a personal kind on which they can and should consult their clergy, either in confession or otherwise. In parishes of manageable size, again, where some instruction of a couple about to be married is usual—and it should be so in all country parishes—the subject can now be handled with a freedom which has been difficult heretofore. The truth is that the Report creates a situation which throws upon the clergy generally, as pastors and as confessors, and not least on theologians, a very great responsibility and opportunity. Principles have got to be thought out, and a procedure created, by which our people may be helped to make right decisions. There is, no doubt, far more material available for this task than appears on the surface; but its collection and co-ordination will not be done in a day. What the Church, and not least the clergy and social workers, have to do is to construct an ethic on the ruins of a taboo. The fact, already mentioned, that the taboo has been removed largely owing to the representation of Catholic confessors, moralists, and medical and social workers, affords ground for hope that the task is not beyond us.

One further point, and we can pass on. The whole treatment of the subject of marriage and sex would have been immensely strengthened if there had been a frank recognition of the vocation to the Religious Life, and of the close bearing of

the estate of chastity on the whole problem. Philosophers such as Professor Eucken and sociologists such as Dr. Förster have alike borne witness to the influence of celibacy, voluntarily chosen, upon the sexual morality of society in general; and the whole Catholic tradition, in East and West alike, implies the claim that the sexual instincts are not least effectively christened when they are surrendered and sublimated altogether. The omission of a point of this kind is part and parcel of the wholesale "domestication" of religion which characterizes moderate Anglicanism. It involves an outlook which falls short of the full *ethos* both of the Gospels and of the Catholic faith. One cannot but regard the omission of this point as an opportunity lost.

III. THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH

Few would dispute that the essential principles of Catholic unity are fully maintained in the broad lines of policy here adopted. Agreement in the Faith, for instance, is a cardinal point which appears to present little difficulty; and it is noted that the Report of the Lausanne Conference on the Church's message to the world was expressly accepted by the Orthodox Delegation. Order, again, is not regarded as a matter in any way indifferent: "We cannot," say the Bishops, "enter into any scheme of federation, involving interchangeability of ministries, while differences on points of order that we think essential still remain, for this would seem to us both to encourage and to express an acquiescence in essential disunion." And again, "the general rule of our Church must . . . be held to exclude indiscriminate Intercommunion, or any such Intercommunion as expresses acquiescence in the continuance of separately organized Churches." Further, the Historic Episcopate is described in such a way as to make it quite clear that it is to be regarded as something very much more than a convenient method of Church government. It "occupies a position which is, in point of historic development, analogous to that of the Canon of Scripture and the Creeds." What the Conference upholds is "the Episcopate, maintained in successive generations by continuity of succession and consecration, as it has been throughout the history of the Church from the earliest times, and discharging those functions which from the earliest times it has discharged." That is what most people mean by the doctrine of Apostolic Succession. And the Report rightly adds to its treatment of this subject that "to those who share that view the historic Order and the prominence of sacramental worship which commonly accompanies it stand for and bear constant witness to the God-given element in the Christian life,

which is prior to and independent of all subjective feeling on our part."

How do these principles work out when applied to the handling of the South India scheme? Our own first impressions, which have followed one another in rapid succession, are, first, of admiration for the skilfulness of the treatment; secondly, of questioning as to whether it is quite consistent; and thirdly, of a kind of belief that it is conceived very much in the Spirit of Christ. Of the skilfulness of the treatment there can be no question. Every liberal principle or exception in Catholic tradition is drawn upon to justify an experiment to which no real parallel can be found. The Eastern principle of "economy" is invoked to cover the toleration of the anomaly involved in the creation of a province of the Church which will be in communion with Christian bodies not in communion with one another. The Western view, sometimes maintained, that consecration *per saltum* is valid, is held to justify the elevation of non-episcopal ministers in South India to the Episcopate. St. Thomas Aquinas, by a kind of *tour de force*, is called in to testify that Confirmation "has not always been regarded as an indispensable preliminary to Ordination as Priest or Consecration as Bishop." And the result of all this, provided that the scheme goes through, is to be the creation of a South Indian Church, which will be a province of the Universal Church, but not a constituent part of the Anglican Communion. Dioceses now part of our Communion are to go out of it, in order to reunite on an episcopal and at least potentially Catholic basis with other Christian bodies; and yet, because they will do this with Lambeth's approval, the secession—if that be the right word—will not be schism. The new Church will then be partly, but not wholly, in communion with the Mother Church. Whether such a position is consistent or not, we do not care to say. One is tempted to think of the status of the Uniate Churches as providing a kind of parallel; but we do not believe that it does. We suspect that, as the problem is without precedent, so too is the solution.

In that case, we should be driven to find reassurance as to its consistency at some point further back than is to be met with in Church history: in other words, in the mind of Christ Himself. And in two ways we believe that light may be found in the Gospels. In the first place, the emphasis upon exceptions in the authoritative religious tradition appears to be an integral part of our Lord's loyalty to institutionalism. Thus, He

appealed, when challenged for allowing His disciples to pluck corn on the sabbath day, to "what David did, when he had need, and was an hungred, he, and they that were with him" (Mark ii. 25)—an example to which the Matthæan account makes our Lord add yet another. And a similar appeal is implied in the Lord's question on another occasion, "Doth not each one of you on the sabbath loose his ox or his ass from the stall, and lead him away to watering?" (Luke xiii. 17). It is true, of course—and the point is too often forgotten—that the passages are Messianic: it was because He was Messiah that He could use the exception as though it were the rule. But the principle involved is not thereby invalidated for those who believe that the Church is the Messianic community, and that its Bishops exercise by His commission His power to bind and to loose. The method of appealing to tradition to justify departure from tradition may claim, in other words, to have the *imprimatur* of our Blessed Lord Himself.

Secondly, this policy seems to us Christianly conceived in the regal gentleness with which authority is exercised. For authority is exercised here at every point. It is exercised in the counsel given to the Indian Episcopate; in the requests that in certain details the scheme should be made more explicit; not least, perhaps, in the silence as to the relation which will subsist between the Bishops of the new province and the Lambeth Conference in the future, if the scheme goes through. But there is nothing whatsoever of the imposing of an imperious will upon this distant daughter Church. The principle of dying to live, of which we wrote in this journal last May, is followed throughout. The new province is not to be Anglican or a part of the Anglican Communion: but it is to be Catholic and a part of the Catholic Church. Certain lines are laid down which, if followed, will enable us to recognize it as such; a degree of communion will exist at once; more, it is hoped, will follow later. All is conceived in a spirit of liberty and of experiment: failure will not compromise Anglicanism, though success may greatly enrich it. Indian Christians themselves, we may suspect, will be sensitive to the appeal of this spirit coming from England at this juncture.

IV. THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION

This section presented what we surmise to have been one of the hardest problems of the Conference—viz., the definition of Anglicanism; and the Bishop of London, we note, endorses our surmise. We need not regret that the idea of the Church

of England overseas has been abandoned; and the substitution for it of a loose association of episcopal Churches in different areas, enjoying intercommunion (though not always in the same degree) and a common tradition of faith, sacraments, and order, has at least the advantage of corresponding to facts. The various administrative provisions will also, no doubt, prove of great value. And yet we cannot feel wholly content. The Conference, which met amid an atmosphere of general expectation and prayer, reached decisions involving both moral and ecclesiastical issues of great importance. The question was, and is, bound to be asked, "By what authority?" Section IV. of the Agenda would seem to have afforded an admirable opportunity for indicating an answer; and the great body of Church-people would have welcomed some statement of Anglican principles which would have shown the depth of their foundation and the scope of their application. We hope that the next Lambeth Conference will address itself to this task.

V. THE MINISTRY

A very charming spirit and atmosphere seem to us to pervade the Committee's Report on this subject, which reveals a very delicate sense of what the sacred Ministry involves. The first subsection is devoted to the supply of candidates for Holy Orders and the reasons for the present shortage of them in this country, as to which a table of statistics for the last eleven years is provided. Three main causes for this state of affairs are mentioned—viz., the unattractive light in which the parson's life is presented, the intellectual difficulties of the Faith, and the financial position of the clergy, together with the cost of training. The Encyclical Letter makes a strong appeal to young men to offer themselves for the Ministry; and the task of encouraging this vocation is laid in the Resolutions upon "every clergyman, schoolmaster, parent and indeed every Christian man and woman." This is all very well; but there are one or two things more to be said. One is that the fostering of vocation is a task that belongs very closely to the work of a Bishop. In every diocese there are presumably boys and young men with nascent vocation, which may easily wither and die unknown unless it is found and fostered by apostolic hands. But that can only be done in the atmosphere of a compact and closely-knit Church life; and such an atmosphere presupposes a very intimate oversight and knowledge of his people by the Bishop. In other words, it presupposes systematic episcopal visitation. In England at present such visitation appears to be the exception rather than the rule; and we believe that nothing would make

a greater difference to the supply of ordinands than a general recovery of this arduous, but intrinsic, function of the episcopate. As a recent article in the *Guardian* pointed out, it is not a question of the size of dioceses; it is primarily a question of how the episcopate is conceived. And lexicography alone would appear to decide it, even if Catholic tradition were not clear.

The Resolutions of the Conference on the Ministry of Women may well prove of even greater importance than those on the Priesthood; and we welcome the treatment of this subject. The Diaconate for Women is now put upon a clearer basis than heretofore; a woman can only become a Deaconess by being regularly ordained to the office; and her functions after ordination are clearly defined. The Church has little to be proud of in the way it has hitherto treated the vocation of women to spiritual ministry in the Church; and the position of Deaconesses has been both ecclesiastically and financially unsatisfactory. Lambeth, while plainly closing one door to aspiration, opens another wider, and we hope that the possibilities thus offered will be widely realized. We believe especially that in rural areas much economy of man-power could be effected, and certain sides of the Church's ministry better discharged, if Deaconesses were given a more definite place in the cure of small parishes.

VI. YOUTH

The Committee's Report on this subject says, we believe, all that could be said; and it is interesting to learn from the Bishop of London, who was its Chairman, how wide a net the Committee threw in its search for evidence. We shall hope to return to this subject in a later number and suggest some lessons based on reminiscences of Cambridge twenty-five years ago.

CONCLUSION

The principal conclusion must be one that has already been mentioned—viz., that the Report should be thoroughly digested and understood. It has not about it that ring of inspired enthusiasm which breathed through the pages of the Report of 1920: but that was scarcely to be expected. The criticisms which it evokes are criticisms not so much of the Conference as of the present stat. of Anglicanism; and that is something which in one way or another most people wish to change. In our own judgment, the chief defect in the Report is the apparent lack of emphasis on the universal and necessary principles which must underlie the work and witness of our Communion,

if it is to make the Catholic appeal which alone can enlist the love and loyalty of men in this generation. In other words, we need a better and more explicit theology of the Church. Meanwhile we are not without encouragement. The statesman-like and generous article by Dr. Carnegie Simpson in the *British Weekly* (August 21) shows that our difficulties are fully appreciated outside our fellowship; and the spirit of brotherhood and loyalty among the Bishops themselves, to which the Bishop of London bears witness, is an asset of the greatest value. We cannot doubt that, when the Hand of God is outstretched to make His people one again, He will find much here that He will choose for His purpose. And we should all do well to remember that, behind the complicated and sometimes controversial details of this Report, there is a mind of the Anglican Communion filled with one single aim—namely, *to help people to love God more and to serve Him better.*

THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE OF 1930

THE seventh Lambeth Conference has come and gone, and certainly to me it has been far the most interesting of those I have attended. I think it will turn out to be the most important of all those which have been, at present, held.

I. THE SOCIAL ASPECT

And first let me touch upon that part of it of which the world knows nothing, and yet which, quite apart from any decisions to which it may have come, constitutes so important an element in it—and that is *the social side*.

To my mind, it would be almost impossible to keep the Anglican Communion—a bad word, but there is no other—a living entity but for the Lambeth Conference.

We lead off with a so-called "Quiet Day" at Fulham, where I have the honour, at every Conference, of being the host of about two hundred Bishops at breakfast, luncheon, and tea. I say "so-called Quiet Day"—because, when men have not seen each other for ten years and meet in the great garden, it is more than human nature can stand not to exchange a few words. However, we were all deeply indebted to Bishop Talbot, who, in spite of his age and infirmities, gave us three excellent addresses. We shall never forget his description of history as "the Category of moving Love."

But the Quiet Day is only the beginning of that Fellowship which is the distinguishing feature of the Congress. The Archbishop and all the home Bishops did their best to entertain and get to know their visitors. The English Bishops all joined in giving a garden party at Lambeth. The American Bishops gave an "At Home" at the English-speaking Union Club, and, at Fulham, we had eleven Bishops with their wives and daughters every Monday to Wednesday, and Thursday to Saturday, during the six weeks, and very delightful it was to see some twenty-four to dinner every night from all parts of the world. It was not difficult to arrange the parties so that Bishops, and their families, from different parts of the world should meet one another. We all parted feeling that we were members of a large and affectionate Christian family, bound together by bonds of mutual love and fellowship.

II. THE RESOLUTIONS

When we come to the Resolutions, for which, alone, the whole Conference is responsible, they have been published in every paper, so that there is no need to recount them here. I will merely touch upon those that have roused most public interest, especially those that have been most widely misunderstood.

(1) The Resolution on *South India*, which was taken unanimously, signifies a bold adventure to which we seemed to be led unanimously by some High Power. The fact that the South Indian Church which is to be formed will cease to be a member of the Anglican Communion, frees that Communion from any official responsibility for what that Church may decide to do in the immediate future, but, on the other hand, the five Bishops who have thus voluntarily cut themselves off from the Communion to which they are attached by such dear and hallowed associations, carry with them the good wishes and prayers of the whole Conference in their great venture of Faith. They are convinced that they will be able to form a great Catholic Church of South India, to be joined, possibly later on, by North India, and that what they are about to do may be a lead to the whole world for a reunited Christendom.

Then again, it should be carefully noted that, while, in another Resolution, in far-away regions all over the world our people are allowed to attend non-Anglican services, rather than have none, it is duly safeguarded in the note to Resolution 42 that:

“By this leave given in exceptional circumstances we are not departing from the Rule of our Church, that the Minister of the Sacrament of Holy Communion shall be a ‘priest especially ordained.’”

(2) *On Birth Control*.—The next Resolution, on which, of course, the popular Press fastened at once, was the extremely guarded and restricted recognition of what is commonly called Birth Control. If, however, the Resolutions are read in their entirety, and in connection with the words of the Encyclical Letter, it will be seen how carefully guarded is the recognition. The ideal held up throughout is the purity of life before marriage, and purity and self-control in marriage. Children are to be looked upon as “the Gifts of God”—to be received thankfully; abortion is a crime; the primary and obvious method of avoiding more children, if that is advisable, is *total abstinence*, and it is only as a *regrettable necessity* that, where the wife’s health would suffer, or family life would, in some other way, be broken up, any other measures are countenanced at all.

For myself, who hate the whole idea of "contraceptives," and doubt whether they are right, morally or physically, and whose slogan has always been: "There is no check recognized by the Church or Bible, except the check of self-control," it was a sad necessity to go as far as we did, but I agree with a Bishop, who shares my views, that "reading the resolutions as a whole, I think the balance appears quite definitely on the side of strictness."

(3) *On Youth.*—I was asked by the Archbishop to be Chairman of the Committee which dealt with "Youth and its Vocation," and, as the Archbishop acknowledged, it was in many ways the most difficult subject of all. We were not set, as the others, certain definite questions to which we had to give an answer—as, for instance, about Reunion or Marriage. We had to diagnose, as well as we could, the attitude of Youth towards religion and morals, and make some sort of an appeal to Youth in the way in which it was likely to go home.

We spared no trouble in getting evidence as to the mind of Youth today. I was in favour of having some young men and women in front of us, and hearing what they had to say, but there were obvious difficulties to this course. Accordingly, we had before us two headmasters of Public Schools, a lady who had great experience at a large Girls' College, Lord Hampton as Chief Commissioner of Youth, Colonel Oyler, to represent the Church Lads' Brigade with the Rev. E. Rogers, General Secretary to the Brigade, Dr. Tissington Tatlow to represent the Student Christian Movement, the Rev. Pat Leonard, in the absence of Mr. Clayton, to represent "Toc H," Lady Cunliffe, the President of the G.F.S., the Chaplain of the Fleet and the representative of the Chaplain General, the Director of the London Council of Youth, Mr. Schumacher from New York, representing the Group Movement started by Mr. Buchman, and Dr. Sherwood Eddy, representing the Y.M.C.A. of the world.

It is important to know the people whom we interviewed, as it gives more force to the Report which we presented to the Conference. We laid our whole emphasis on the Report, and, unlike other committees, only presented *one* resolution to the Conference, to the effect that "The Report should be studied and read in all parts of the world," and this was passed unanimously.

The Report is, of course, published among the other Reports, but it should be noted that we had, on our Committee, men who had become famous for their work among Youth in every part of the world—men like Bishop Roots of Hankow, the Bishops of New Hampshire and South Ohio in the United

States, Bishop Embling from Corea, the Bishop of Croydon, the Bishop of Portsmouth (a lifelong parish priest), the Bishop of Bloemfontein, besides the Bishops of St. Alban's and Ely, who took a very prominent part in drawing up the Report; nor must we forget our hard-working secretaries, the Bishops of Whitby and Barrow-in-Furness.

It was very striking that, with the exception of one of the lady witnesses, who spoke of the girls of the day as being "many of them, hard, callous, and cynical," the overwhelming weight of evidence was that there was no widespread "revolt of Youth" against religion and morality. They were, they said, many of them bewildered, "put off" conventional religion by what they thought its unreality, determined to find things out for themselves, and quite resolved not to take things merely "on authority," but they were all hungering for something, on the lookout for a religion they could respect, and ready to follow any leader who won their love and confidence.

Our Report, then, was to that effect, and our appeal, both in the Report and the Encyclical Letter, was to those in that frame of mind.

Whether it will do any good or not time will show. Other resolutions, founded on the Report, were proposed at the full Conference, but were turned down, as either being too vague or as likely rather to repel than win the Youth of the day, in their present rather critical state of mind.

But now I must say a word about the Reports, although the full Conference is not responsible for them.

III. THE REPORTS

(1) *On the Being of God*.—Although first in importance, it was the one which was taken last in the full Conference, that they might end on the highest note, and was the report which dealt with the *Being of God*.

Here again I have no doubt that the readers of THEOLOGY have read and studied this able document long before this time. We have only to look at the names of the Bishops who were in charge of this Committee to see with what weight this Report came to us. I will only say as a working missionary that there is absolutely nothing more essential than to clear the minds of men and women of false ideas of God.

Mr. McCormick, in his Lenten book, *Be of Good Cheer*, tells a heartrending story of a young soldier who waited for his leave for two years, and who was killed by a long-range shell just as he was about to enter the train which would have taken him home. As he died, he said to the Padre: "Wasn't that like

God!" meaning, wasn't it like God to disappoint him at the last moment. So again, that mischievous translation that

"God spiest out all our ways,"

leads to the conception of God as "*THE GREAT SPY*"!

The farmer who was told that Providence had burnt down his ricks said: "That-there Providence! He took the old missus last year, and now He has burnt down my ricks, but, thank God, there is One above, who will be down on 'im—one of these days!"

Now, in answer to these misguided and misshapen ideas of God, this Report ought to come as a solace and a relief. All ideas about God, which are inconsistent with His being like Jesus Christ, are to be laid aside. I have often myself said that one of the most comforting verses of the Bible is the saying of our Lord: "He that hath seen *Me* hath seen the Father."

There are plenty of difficulties which are unsolved, and always will be, by any report, difficulties as to how far God can be held responsible for the earthquake, accidents, and other horrors which occur from time to time—how far they can be called (as the lawyers phrase it) "Acts of God"!

There is the old eternal difficulty as to how to reconcile the Free-Will of Man and the Foreordaining Will of God, and the still greater difficulty of accounting for the existence of evil, but if we firmly hold to the sheet-anchor held out to us in the Report, we shall not drift far.

If God, in His essential character, was truly revealed in Jesus Christ, then we have something firm to hold on to; we may say to one another, in the words of the well-known hymn:

"Take it on trust a little while,
Soon shall ye read the mystery right
In the full sunshine of His smile!"

(2) Another very interesting Report is that on the *Anglican Communion*.

I am purposely not looking again at these Reports, for fear of being drawn into too great details, but I am merely recalling my impressions of the long debates which followed the reception of the Report. No one who has not tried will realize how hard it is, actually, to *define* the Anglican Communion.

Resolution 49 was the result of a debate of nearly six hours. I need not reproduce it here, though it might be useful to put it in a footnote. The difficulty was to find a definition which would be equally applicable to Churches in China, Japan, Russia, the United States, the British Dominions beyond the seas, as well as to the Church in the British Isles, and also which would allow the Church of South India, if formed on Catholic

lines, to rejoin it, without ceasing to be an independent Church in India. Whether we succeeded in finding the right definition is a matter of opinion, but the thing itself is a greater reality than any definition of it.

Another very difficult question was how far *Centralization* should be carried in the Anglican Communion. It was clearly impossible to make the Consultative Committee of the Lambeth Conference a Court of Appeal, and therefore it was decided that the establishment of Final Courts of Appeal should be left to the decision of local and regional Churches, and that the Consultative Committee, like the Lambeth Conference itself, should only be an Advisory Body, to which questions of difficulty might be referred for advice, but that the advice given *would not be binding* in any Province which had asked such advice. Naturally the spread of provincial organization was pressed upon the Church at large as the best and most satisfactory method of governing so large and widespread a Communion.

(3) *The Ministry of the Church*.—The only other Report which I have time to mention is that on the Ministry of the Church.

The salient features of this were:

(1) That the idea of the *Priesthood for Women* was "turned down"—almost unanimously.

This was all the more remarkable, as a very able pamphlet, in defence of the idea, had been circulated among all the Bishops, in which the arguments in favour had been most forcibly given.

The reasons for rejecting it are given in the Report. On the other hand, Deaconesses are to have a far stronger position, and are to be given far more responsible work. It was felt that you could not expect the ablest of the young women of the day to become Deaconesses if they were, in parishes, to be practically indistinguishable from the, often untrained, woman worker.

(2) The idea of *Auxiliary Priests* (called in Mr. Allen's book *Voluntary Clergy*) was very fully discussed, and a modified blessing was given to it:

"The Conference sees no insuperable objection to the use, with provincial sanction, and under proper safeguards, where the need is great, of such *Auxiliary Priests*."

The real difficulty in dealing with a world-wide Communion is that steps, which might be helpful in the prairie districts of Canada, or in the wild bush of Australia, would be unnecessary, and even harmful, in England.

The whole idea is that these Auxiliary Priests are to earn

their living by their work in civil employment, and to carry out their clerical duties *without payment*. There were strong fears expressed by many Bishops that such a system would make it far harder for them to raise money for "a whole-time man," and, of course, the obvious danger is always present:

"That these men, who, *ex hypothesi*, are only to receive a very moderate training, may drift away from where they are now, and find themselves back in the home country and expect to be given work there, for which they are not really fitted."

Of course, this could be to a certain extent controlled under the Colonial Clergy Act, and by the necessity for the license of the Bishop, but, on the other hand, it is very uncomfortable for the Church to have clergy in full Priest's Orders who, for one reason or another, have lost their means of living—drifting about without work! There is no greater scandal than a priest in a London workhouse, and that has not been found an impossibility, even under present conditions.

(3) Naturally, under the report on the Ministry, the disquieting statistics with regard to Ordination candidates are given, and an appeal is made in that report and in the report on Youth to the heart of Youth to take up what all admit to be the best and noblest of all the professions, if entered upon in the right spirit.

And so, one by one, "the Captains and the Kings" depart! Already many of the Bishops have gone back to their distant homes, and we at home are having ourselves a short holiday to face our future work.

We all acknowledge how excellently our new Archbishop has discharged his duty as Chairman, and are hoping that the strain has not been too much for his health. It is impossible to convey to those, outside the Conference, the wonderful spirit of fellowship and brotherhood which has prevailed. The debates have been long and eager; opinions have been widely divided, but never for an instant has there been any lack of charity in imputing unworthy motives to others, and we must now leave the result with God, who will, we trust, overrule any mistakes we have made, and bless and prosper whatever, in our deliberations, He sees fit to use for the spread of His Kingdom upon earth.

A. F. LONDON:

PHYSICS AND THE MODERNIST : "WHAT IS TRUTH?"

Science: Knowledge systematized: truth ascertained.—(*English Dictionary*.)

Kaleidoscope: An optical toy in which we see an endless variety of beautiful colours and forms.—(*Ibid.*)

OF late years much has been written to the effect that modern views on Physical Science are, in their philosophical aspect, far more compatible with Christian thought than were the views that were presented to us a generation ago. It is unquestionable that the transformation-scene which has occurred in pure Physics has been accompanied by a corresponding change in the philosophical conceptions that follow, and, accordingly, a review of the new relations between Physics and Theology becomes both interesting and important. Such a review involves some inquiry, not only into the past history of the relations between the two worlds of thought, in order to make their present relations clear, but also into the relations that now exist, in order that we may be able to form some idea of the future developments that are likely to occur. For, in days to come, a position, more or less stable in Theology though not in Science, is likely to succeed to the present remission in a hostility that has persisted ever since the Ptolemaic Cosmology was abandoned in the middle of the sixteenth century.

Regarding the subject from a historical point of view, we find that, from the second century to the first half of the sixteenth century, the scientific work of Claudius Ptolemy stood unchallenged, and was accepted as a permanent and integral part of the religious philosophy of Christendom. At the end of that period a New Knowledge arose. The great work of Copernicus, *De Revolutionibus Orbium Celestium*, propounding a new geometry of the heavens, was printed in 1543, the year of his death. At a later date his theories were confirmed by the physical observations of Galileo (who died in 1642), when he turned his newly invented telescope to the skies, and the Ptolemaic Cosmology fell in ruins. No longer was it possible to regard the earth as the centre of creation: it had become but one of a series of planets, and men could no longer regard themselves as the pivot of a Universe that had been formed for their habitation.

Thus the Roman theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were placed in an extraordinarily difficult position. Together with their science, the philosophical foundations on which they rested their creed had vanished, and they found

themselves placed upon the horns of a painful dilemma. On the one hand, alleging that its integrity was essential to the Faith, they might uphold the ancient system with whose truth and permanence they had, for so many centuries, linked the fate of Christianity. On the other hand, the only course open to them was to accept the New Knowledge, and to conform their beliefs to its implications.

The Roman Church adopted the first of these alternatives. Galileo was silenced by the Papacy in 1616; the Copernican theory was pronounced "false and altogether opposed to Holy Scripture," and it was not until 1822 that Rome would recognize the sun as the centre of a system of planets. By that time it was found that the facts first demonstrated by Galileo could neither be disproved nor ignored. The course that was taken by the Roman theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had failed utterly, and it is certain that, of the two possible alternatives, the one then chosen will never again be heard of. Accordingly, the other horn of the dilemma has by now been accepted, and Modernist theologians pride themselves, in Dr. H. D. A. Major's words, on "fearlessly welcoming new truth."*

The result of taking this latter course requires more detailed examination than I have given to the first alternative, because the full consequence of its adoption has not yet had time to become obvious in the pages of history, and its gravity has not yet declared itself. For the purpose of this examination there is no need to go far back or to bring any long period under review. The death of Queen Victoria and the beginning of the twentieth century nearly coincided, and, in many departments of life, draw a dividing-line between the end of one epoch and the beginning of the next. Especially has this been the case in Physical Science, and the philosophical implications of the Physics of the nineteenth century and those of the twentieth century are not merely inconsistent, but directly contradict one another. These implications are ultimately dependent upon the view that is held concerning the nature of matter, and the remarkable discrepancy between the conception of the atom that was dominant in the nineteenth and the conception of it that prevails at present, becomes the cardinal point that has to be considered.

The mental image of the atom that was unquestioned during the last half of the nineteenth century arose from the definite quantitative facts of chemical combination. The atom was defined as the smallest quantity of an element that could exist in combination. Matter was incapable of further division,

* *Daily Mail*, November 28, 1929.

and the resulting particle, the atom, was eternally unchangeable, eternally indestructible. The atom persisted unmodified through every chemical reaction: the atoms that constituted one element differed from those that formed another, but the unchangeability of each rendered the notion that one element might be transmuted into another no more than the preposterous dream of mediæval alchemy, and the indestructibility of these hard massy particles connoted the indestructibility, the conservation, of all matter. The idea that matter might be converted into energy was, if possible, even more fantastic than the idea of transmutation from one element to another. The principle of the conservation of energy accompanied that of the conservation of matter. Energy could be transformed; mechanical work, heat, light and electricity were interchangeable; but the total amount present in the Universe was a permanently fixed quantity that could neither be increased nor diminished. The man who so much as contemplated the possibility of a "perpetual motion machine," a machine that generated its own energy, was slighted as merely a fool.

But what is the picture that is presented to us by the Physics of 1930? The Physics of the twentieth century differs *toto cœlo* from that of the nineteenth century. The all-conquering atom of the nineteenth century has vanished utterly, and the history of twentieth-century Physics is the history of the disappearance of the physical conceptions of the nineteenth century. Towards the end of the last century the historic experiments of Sir Joseph Thomson, Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, first showed that it was possible to break up the atom, and, in 1911, the work of Sir Ernest Rutherford demonstrated its structure. An excessively minute nucleus carries a charge of positive electricity, and, around it, a number of negatively charged electrons describe orbits at inconceivable speeds. The atoms of the various elements differ from one another in the weight of the nucleus, the amount of the charge of positive electricity that it carries, and the number of the electrons around it. The amount of the positive charge of electricity that is carried by the nucleus is exactly sufficient to neutralize the combined negative charges of the electrons that circulate around it. The speed of the motion of the electrons saves them from being drawn into the nucleus by the attraction of positive for negative electricity, just as the orbital motion of the earth saves it from being drawn into the sun.

These atoms stand in contrast to those of the nineteenth century in that they are not unchangeable. The spontaneous disintegration of the radio-active atoms of uranium, for instance, leads to the transformation of uranium into lead and helium,

accompanied by the setting free of radiation. The nitrogen atom, unlike that of uranium, does not undergo spontaneous disintegration, but, in 1919, Rutherford was able to shatter its nucleus, and, of its constituents, hydrogen nuclei were shot out. The mediæval conception of the transmutability of the elements has ceased to be fantastic.

Neither are these atoms eternal or indestructible. Under stellar conditions the positive and negative charges of the atom are liable to rush together, annihilating one another, and setting free their energy, loose in space, as a flash of radiation, "similar," says Sir James Jeans (*The Universe Around Us*. Cambridge University press, 1929), p. 189, "to the flash of lightning which indicates that the negative and positive charges in two thunder-clouds have met and neutralized one another." In the stars, this transformation of matter into energy proceeds upon a vast scale. To quote Sir James Jeans again (*op. cit.* p. 175): "The sun must have weighed 360,000 million tons more than now at this time yesterday, and will weigh 360,000 million tons less at this time to-morrow." Thus matter has now completely lost the character that was attributed to it in the nineteenth century: it is now seen to be, like mechanical work, heat, light or electricity, one of the forms of energy. Sir James Jeans sums up the matter by saying (*op. cit.* p. 186): "The two fundamental corner-stones of nineteenth-century physics, the conservation of matter and the conservation of energy, are both abolished, or rather are replaced by the conservation of a single entity which may be matter and energy in turn." To add one further point, it is interesting to note that, under certain circumstances, the atom (Sir James Jeans, *op. cit.* p. 132) "becomes a true perpetual-motion machine, the electrons continuing to move in their orbits (at any rate, on Bohr's theory), without any of the energy of their motion being dissipated away, either in the form of radiation or otherwise. It seems astonishing and quite incomprehensible that an atom in such a state should not be able to yield up its energy still further, but, so far as our experience goes, it cannot. And this property, little though we understand it, is, in the last resort, responsible for keeping the whole Universe in being. If no restriction of this kind intervened, the whole material energy of the Universe would disappear in the form of radiation in a few thousand-millionth parts of a second."

But that is not the whole of the story. Mr. W. C. Dampier-Whetham, F.R.S., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, in *A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion* (Cambridge University Press, 1929), p. 470, writes as follows: "Moreover, there seems a fundamental limit to the

accuracy of possible knowledge about these wave-systems which constitute electrons. If, from the equations, we calculate the exact position of an electron, its velocity becomes uncertain. If we calculate its exact velocity, we cannot specify its position accurately. This uncertainty is connected with the relation between the size of an electron and the wave-length of the light by which it might be observed. With long wave-lengths, no exact definition can be obtained. When the wave-length is decreased enough to give definition, the radiation knocks the electron out of its position. There seems here an ultimate impossibility of exact knowledge, a fundamental indeterminacy behind which we cannot go." The same author (*op cit.* p. 413) says: "The idea of the simultaneous certainty of the two" (i.e. the position and the velocity) "seems to correspond with nothing in nature. Eddington called this result the principle of indeterminacy and assigns to it an importance equal to that of the principle of relativity.* It is now more usually called the principle of uncertainty."

We now see that the picture of Physical Science, as it has shown itself during the last sixty or seventy years, reveals a remarkable state of things. The physical conceptions of the first half of that period stand in startling contrast to those of the second half. The rapidity of the necessary re-adjustment of one's scientific outlook produces a sense of stupefaction and a feeling of intellectual giddiness. The corresponding change in philosophical outlook is not less radical. It may be conceded that, in pure science, these changes represent what is called progress. When, however, we turn to the consideration of the philosophical implications that are proper to the pure science of each of these two periods, no such conclusion is possible. Then, we do not see anything that can be called progress, or any advance towards an intelligible goal. What we do see is, on the contrary, no less than a right-about turn.

It has already become difficult to realize the position of the intellectual world in the later decades of the nineteenth century. The physical science of that period, and the philosophical inferences that were drawn from it, were regarded as possessions of the human intellect that had been secured for all time. A conviction, moreover, was widespread to the effect that all the great principles of knowledge had already been defined. This sense of certainty combined with finality had some curious effects. It was felt that the mind of man had achieved its most important work: the limits of possible knowledge, if not attained, had become discernible. One cannot read, for

* These words probably refer to A. S. Eddington, F.R.S., *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 220 (A. J. H.).

example, such a work as Charles Pearson's *National Life and Character: a Forecast* (Macmillan, 1893) without becoming conscious of the writer's conviction that, although further amplifications and applications of known laws might yet remain to be discovered, the romance and sense of adventure had departed from scientific work. A condition of rest had been reached, in which all thought and all philosophy were dominated by the current conception of the atom and the corresponding principles of the Conservation of Matter and the Conservation of Energy. The matter and the energy that could neither be created nor destroyed, and the atom that could not be deflected from its path, led inevitably to a philosophic determinism. The uniformity of nature had been definitely established, and it was a proved proposition that the course of all things that were to come had been determined already by the events that had taken place in the past. In a word, the nineteenth century endorsed the dictum of Greek philosophy: ὁ θεὸς γεωμετρεῖ. The idea of responsibility to, or communication with, the Ultimate Power of the Universe became chimerical, and what was known as "enlightened self-interest" took the place of self-sacrifice.

Thus the theologians of the nineteenth century found themselves in an even more difficult position than that which faced the theologians of the time of Galileo, and, as early as 1874, W. R. Greg, in his *Rocks Ahead or the Warnings of Cassandra*, p. 129, notes the "Divorce (and latent antagonism)" that was even then in progress between "the highest intellects of the Nation and the National Belief." The theologians, unwilling and unable to ignore scientific teachings in the construction of Christian philosophy, accepted the horn of the dilemma that had been avoided by their predecessors of the sixteenth century, and sought to bring their creed into some sort of conformity with the implications of current scientific knowledge. Gradually all the miraculous was rejected; it was found to belong to a pre-scientific age that had no knowledge of scientific law. But, in truth, such concessions availed nothing; the incompatibility between the two views was radical, and the effort to mingle them was hopeless from the start, for the doctrine of the reign of law ruled out all possibility of Freedom of the Will and the corresponding conception of moral responsibility in the sight of God.

The twentieth century has already witnessed not only the supersession of the Physics of the nineteenth century but the displacement of the philosophical implications that were deducible therefrom. New implications have to be drawn from the nature and structure of the new atom, and it is precisely

there, in the very stronghold of determinism, that the change is most complete. There, the intrusion of "Indeterminacy," of the "Principle of Uncertainty," has taken place. The concourse of the atoms has become indeed fortuitous, the uniformity of nature has disappeared, and no longer is it possible to maintain a sheer determinism. In reference to this aspect of the matter, Dampier-Whetham (*op. cit.* p. 372) writes as follows: "Yet it must be pointed out that the recent changes in physics, which began in 1925, seem, in this year 1929, likely to weaken the argument from mechanical determinism itself. Philosophy has been wont to draw its strongest evidence for scientific determinism from physics, where it was thought there was a closed circuit of mechanical necessity . . . and now, as will be explained later, the new wave-mechanics seem to suggest that there is a principle of indeterminacy at the base of the ultimate units or electrons which, by the nature of the case, make an exact measurement of *both* position and velocity for ever impossible. If this surprising development be confirmed, the strongest scientific argument for philosophic determinism will break down." Further on, the writer (*op. cit.* p. 473) restates the point even more definitely: "The alternative uncertainties that, if we try to calculate the position of an electron, its velocity becomes incalculable, and if we wish to determine its velocity, its position becomes indeterminate, seem to indicate that, in ultimate analysis, scientific determinism breaks down." He notes (also on p. 372) that while the movement of the large masses dealt with by Newtonian dynamics, and of molecules considered statistically in large numbers, is determined by the conditions of the system, the behaviour of individual molecules is incalculable by present methods. On p. 473 he points out the analogy between these uncertainties and those which are found in the study of living organisms. The tables of averages, for instance, on which life insurance is conducted, show calculable certainties, but it is impossible to say when any particular insurance policy will fall in. The philosophical implication necessarily drawn from the physics of the nineteenth century stands in flat contradiction to that which is necessarily drawn from the knowledge of today, for the Physical Science of the twentieth century delivers the new judgment ὁ θεὸς οὐ γεωμετρεῖ.*

It would, however, be a mistake to seize upon the idea that

* It ought to be noted, however, that we have been already warned of a possible absence of finality in this judgment also, and that, in its turn, it may be reversed before long. The Scientific Correspondent of *The Times*, in an article on *New Conceptions in Physics*, published on November 18, 1929, concludes by remarking that "wave-mechanics are now recovering cause and effect as steady and calculable relations in a six-dimensional reality."

the scientific conclusions of the twentieth century point the way to the construction of a philosophy of Christianity any more than the scientific conclusions of the nineteenth century did so. "Indeterminacy," "Uncertainty"—these are strong words. Do they mean that Chance has been revealed, lying at the basis of things? The conception is startling, but it is inevitable. And if we are face to face with Chance, we are meeting with an idea that is no more compatible with the formation of any rational doctrine of the Freedom of the Will than is possible when we encounter the reign of Law and the determinism of the nineteenth century. For the conception of Will is as foreign to Chance as it is to Law. Chance, irresponsible indeed, but irresistible, is no less tyrannous than despotic Law. It is true that the "large masses dealt with by Newtonian dynamics" and "molecules considered statistically in large numbers," being determined by the conditions of the system, may (like the tables of averages of a life insurance company) furnish that orderly environment which has to be postulated for the Will to be Free in any comprehensible sense of the term. But if, behind that orderly environment, Chance lies, and not Will, then the science of the twentieth century, like that of the nineteenth, denies the possibility of our Freedom.

The position becomes stranger still when, neglecting alike the nineteenth century and the twentieth century, we reflect upon the nature of Physical Science as a whole. When we do so, we find that its facts, and the inferences that can be drawn from them, are purely ephemeral, and we are constrained to regard them, facts and inferences alike, with a correspondingly agnostic temper of mind. The worker in Science will not himself do more. For the genuinely scientific attitude is one that regards the conclusions of science as tentative and provisional. Finality cannot be claimed for them at the present or in any other stage in their progress, past or future. The worker in science is unperturbed when one series of observations is found wanting and gives place to another: unperturbed even when the philosophical inferences to be drawn from the new discoveries contradict the inferences that were drawn from an older knowledge. He does not aspire to finality. To him, his own conclusions are always suspect. Another turn of the kaleidoscope and they are gone irrecoverably.

But it is of the essence of a philosophy of Christianity that it should be static, not, that is, true at one time and false at another, but true in a sincere sense of the word. Thus the theologian errs if he bases his belief upon the findings of observational science, or even takes them into account. For the findings of Physics being necessarily ephemeral, it follows

that any beliefs that are based upon them are necessarily suspect. Let us, for example, assume that the Physical Science of the twenty-first century, rejecting alike both Law and Chance, discovers a view that proclaims the Freedom of the Will. That proclamation would be worthless. The twenty-second century would find that the vision had faded. There is, in fact, no possibility that an inference drawn from the physics of any era can have value as a basis for Christian philosophy.

We have seen the utter defeat that overtook the stiff-necked Roman theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who, choosing one horn of the dilemma that faced them, clung obstinately to the Ptolemaic Cosmology. Modernist theologians, choosing the other horn, and holding themselves prepared at any time to conform their religious beliefs to the teachings of current science, are doomed to a similar fate. Neither horn of the dilemma will serve, and the pliability of the Modernist is in no respect more rational than the obscurantist attitude of his Roman predecessors of the time of Galileo. At bottom, they make the same mistake. The error that is made by both is born of the futility of any attempt to link the philosophy of Christianity to the ceaseless change and self-stultification that are for ever inherent in the endless process of discovery that we call Physical Science.

ARTHUR JOHN HUBBARD, M.D.

THE DIVINE LOGOS AND THE UNIVERSE

IN a previous article* I attempted to examine the bearings of the modern mathematico-physical philosophy of science upon the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation. It there appeared that it was quite possible to express this doctrine in terms of the categories associated with the modern standpoint, and furthermore that certain difficulties which generally appear in discussions of the Incarnation received, if not a solution, at least reason for believing that a solution could be found. The starting-point of the discussion was the principle that, apart from the Incarnation, God is not subject to the spatio-temporal order of the Universe, being causally antecedent to it or, to use a convenient metaphor, "outside" it.

What I wish to do here is to consider, from the same standpoint, a question that arises from the previous one and is indeed implicit in it—namely, how we are to conceive the mode of relationship of the Divine Logos to the created Universe.

* In THEOLOGY, December, 1929.

The relation of the Divine Logos to the Universe appears to us as containing two elements, which may be broadly described as creation and redemption. The term "redemption" is here used not in the narrower sense of reconciliation of fallen mankind, but in a broader sense as standing for the whole process of unification of the Universe with God, which follows from the historical event of the Incarnation. It is perhaps well to emphasize strongly these two functions of the Logos, since there is a tendency in certain circles to view creation as the act of God the Father alone, and to restrict the function of the Logos to the Incarnation. This view is naturally frequently associated with a virtual denial, or at least a polite avoidance, of the true deity of Christ; and it is, of course, quite incompatible with the witness of the historic Church. "The Word was God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made," is the teaching of the Fourth Gospel, and this is echoed in the Nicene Creed in the assertion that by the Son all things were made. Of course, in the last resort, creation derives from God the Father, "Maker of heaven and earth," but it can hardly be too strongly stressed that the immediate agent of creation is the Divine Logos. The view here disowned is frequently associated in popular thought with another, and perhaps more serious, error—namely, the concept of creation as an isolated act by which, at a remote epoch in the past, God called the Universe into existence, letting it thenceforth run its own course unchecked, save by certain irruptive and *ad hoc* interferences for specific purposes. It is this view that Mr. J. S. Haldane attacks, and rightly, in his Gifford Lectures on *The Sciences and Philosophy*, but he unfortunately appears to believe that it is part of the essential faith of the historic Church. It is thus important, especially in view of the fact that modern physics makes it very difficult to conceive of a temporal process occurring without the existence of either a material Universe or experiencing beings, to try to formulate exactly what we mean by creation.

We surely mean just this; that creation is the incessant act of divine volition by which the whole fabric of the spatio-temporal experience of all finite minds is maintained in existence. It is the act of God in virtue of which from moment to moment the universe that we experience continues to exist. If, *per impossibile*, the creative will of God could be suspended for a moment, our whole spatio-temporal environment, and hence also we who experience it, would momentarily cease to exist.* Of course, when we are considering those aspects of the Universe

* Cf. Professor Whitehead's view of God as the principle of concretion, developed in *Science and the Modern World*.

that are dealt with by the physical sciences, we naturally view* the course of nature as an orderly development according to mathematical laws from an initial configuration; but this is only an abstraction, though a very useful and, for practical purposes, a necessary one; and when we are confronted by a great work of art or an intense religious experience it is impossible not to feel the divine creativeness as an ever-present act ingredient into all our experience.

Thus creation is experienced by us as the organic whole of relationships between the Divine Logos and created minds by which He concretes (*i.e.*, presents to them) the whole temporal successions of events that form their lives. This does not involve the denial of human freedom, for many of the experiences that God concretes may be concreted by Him in response to the free choice of the experient. It does mean, however, that the actuality of the experience *when chosen* (and, indeed, the freedom of the experient to choose) is due to the divine will. Thus creation is a set of relationships between the Logos and the created Universe, in virtue of which the Universe possesses actuality; that is, in virtue of which the experience of finite beings exists. It is the complex aggregate of those relationships in virtue of which the various elements of the various experiences of various experimenters have occurred, are occurring, or will occur. Every constituent of every experience exists because God wills it, and it is the totality of these acts of will that we describe as creation.

Thus, from the eternal† standpoint, from "outside" space-time, creation is simply that relationship of the Logos to the Universe through which it exists as separate from Him. It is, so to speak, God's power in action, the concrete embodiment of the divine attribute of omnipotence. It is the omnipotence of God that is primarily expressed in the eternal act of creation.

We must now consider the second type of relationship between the Divine Logos and the Universe, that of redemption, which is manifested in the incarnate life of Jesus of Nazareth. In the previous article I dealt in some detail with the relation of the Incarnation to space-time, and I can here only briefly indicate the main conclusion arrived at. This was that the human life of our Lord, while it is a true spatio-temporal experience undergone by the Logos in His human nature, is also present as a whole to His divine nature. Viewed from our standpoint within the space-time order, the human life of our

* Or, rather, did view, until the advent of Relativity and the Quantum theory.

† The word "eternal" is used, as in the previous article referred to, as meaning not "everlasting" but "extra-spatio-temporal."

Lord began at the Incarnation, but from the eternal standpoint it is present to the Divine Logos with the rest of the space-time process as a whole, as the act of divine condescension whereby, through the relationships that constitute His human nature, the Logos, without any incompleteness in the relationships that constitute His deity, is yet subject to the order of the created Universe.

As seen by us, then, the human life of Christ is a complex whole composed of all those relationships between the Logos and created beings in virtue of which He is present as Redeemer to them at all the various moments of their lives. These relationships link the Logos as Redeemer to all the events of human life subsequent to* the primary event of the Incarnation. They thus constitute, when viewed from the eternal standpoint, a set of eternal relationships between the Logos and the space-time process by which the whole of that process is present, as redeemed, to God.

Thus redemption, like creation, is an eternal relationship of God to the space-time order. But whereas creation is the act by which the Logos maintains the Universe in existence as distinct from Himself, redemption is the act by which He unites it to Himself. I described creation as God's power in action, the concrete embodiment of the divine omnipotence. Similarly, redemption, the relationship between God and creation constituted by the humanity of Christ, may be described as God's love in action, the concrete embodiment of the divine condescension.

This interlocking of power and love, of omnipotence and condescension, of creation and redemption, thus expresses the twofold relation that exists between the Divine Logos and the Universe that is His. Creation and redemption are not merely processes in time; they are the forms under which we see the divine power and love. Their historical aspect as processes is not, it must be emphasized, illusory; but it is the manifestation in space and time of a meta-historical or meta-cosmic† reality, namely, the dual relation of the Logos to the universe as Creator and Redeemer. The cosmic and meta-cosmic aspects cannot be separated, except in thought. There is a type of religious pragmatism sometimes to be met with, which is prepared to jettison the historicity of the Incarnation if it can retain what it describes as the "spiritual meaning." "Never mind," it says in effect, "whether God was incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth, so long as God is the sort of God that could have

* Or, in the language of Relativity, "in the absolute future of."

† I prefer this term here to "meta-historical" as it suggests antecedence not merely to time but to the whole space-time process.

become incarnate, so long as God regards us in the way He would have regarded us if He had been incarnate." Such a view is absolutely irreconcilable with the line I have developed here. The spiritual meaning of the Incarnation is not one thing and its historicity another; they are two aspects of the same thing. The divine love towards the Universe, expressed by saying that "God is the sort of God that could have become incarnate," is constituted by eternal relationships which, when viewed from inside space-time, constitute the incarnate life of Christ, and we can no more separate the two aspects than we can separate the inside and the outside of a glove.

I must just emphasize, what of course every practising Catholic knows, that the humanity of Christ was not destroyed at the Ascension. It was liberated by the Resurrection from many of the laws that ordinarily control human beings, and at the Ascension it ceased to be normally* perceptible to the senses, but it still remains humanity (though dignified by the highest honour humanity could bear), and mediates to us the divine life through the sacraments of the Church and pre-eminently in the Sacrament of the Altar.

Finally, I wish to say a few more words about a question on which I touched briefly in the previous article. Does the view of God as extra-spatio-temporal involve a deterministic outlook? If the whole space-time process is eternally present to God, is the future not fixed? I pointed out before that the eternal presence to God of the space-time process is essentially *sui generis* and not to be likened to our acts of anticipation, or present consciousness, or memory, and that relationships of determinacy and contingency, though strictly real, are relationships within the space-time order, and have no significance relative to the eternal standpoint. I would just add this: that in any case the difficulties involved are less on this view than on the view which considers God as essentially subject to the time-processes of the Universe. For on the latter view it is possible to reconcile the divine foreknowledge with human freedom only by some such phrase as that "things do not happen because God foresees them, but God foresees them because they are about to happen"; while, on the view I have set forward, the whole Universe, past, present, and future, is present as a whole to God, and the difficulties both of human freedom and of imperfection, which are found when we examine the universe from within, resolve themselves in the light of redemption when seen from without.

* I insert the word "normally" because I should say that in all authentic visions and kindred mystical experiences of our Lord there is an objective manifestation of the divine humanity, though, of course, in its glorified state.

To sum up, then, the Divine Logos stands to the Universe in this eternal double relation of power and love, which, when viewed from within the space-time order, is manifested in the twofold act of creation and redemption. If we wish to find one word to include these two elements, I do not think we could choose a better term than "wisdom," using the word, of course, not in the narrow sense of intellect or prudence, but as denoting the whole nature of God in so far as it is apprehensible by mankind; that wisdom which, in the words of the antiphon, "cometh out of the mouth of the Most High, and reacheth from one end to the other, mightily and sweetly ordering all things"; that wisdom which is "created from the beginning before the world, and to the end shall not fail."

NOTE.—The view of the human nature of Christ as eternally present to the Divine Logos appears to me to agree entirely with the treatment of Christology by Father Thornton in *The Incarnate Lord*. The taking up of "the human organism of the Christ, with its own proper principle of unity and its own law of being, . . . on to the level of the Eternal Word, who thus becomes its super-organic principle of unity and bestows upon it super-organic and absolute individuality"** is an exact description from the intra-spatio-temporal standpoint of the eternal presence of the human nature to the Divine Logos.

E. L. MASCALL.

LATIN HYMNS OF THE EARLY PERIOD

THE interest in Latin hymns is not likely to wane so long as they find a place in our hymnbooks, although the majority of worshippers can only know them through the medium of translation. The *English Hymnal*, for example, has nearly 160 of them, and though the originals may be reproduced with varying degrees of felicity, even in their English form they inevitably awaken curiosity. Who wrote them? In what metrical form did they first appear? The compilers of the E.H. are to be congratulated on the fact that they invariably print the first words of the Latin original, adding the name of the author when known and the initials of the translator. This is all to the good, but where are we to find the originals?

We might suggest that these hymns of the E.H., though a considerable proportion are extracts which by church usage have established themselves as hymns, would make a good

* *The Incarnate Lord*, pp. 282-3.

anthology, and the addition of further information about authors and sources would be useful to the general reader. More than half the translated hymns, however, are anonymous, being chiefly office hymns: even in the case of the remainder, the traditional ascription of authorship of not a few hymns must be described as doubtful. There is a certain splendour in this anonymity, as if the unknown authors were more concerned about the glory of God than their own fame. To quote Dr. J. S. Phillimore, they gave "in the very spirit of a monk the glory to the house of their religious profession." These words occur in the preface to his *Hundred Best Latin Hymns* (Gowan), which is the latest and cheapest anthology in existence. It arranges the hymns in chronological order, and the stand-point is that of a learned Roman Catholic, distinguishing it from the still valuable and justly prized *Latin Sacred Poetry*, by R. C. Trench, which to the public of an earlier generation was the standard introduction to Latin hymnology. Trench was an erudite and spiritually-minded Anglican scholar, endowed with an acute literary sense and an admirable critical capacity, and a lover of the classics, as is proved by his charming notes and reflections. His selection has no relation to chronology, but is rather concerned with "an inner scheme" which arranges the hymns "into one great poem" covering a wide field of Christian theology. Readers will also know Newman's *Hymni Ecclesiae*, a collection from the Roman and Paris breviaries.

We cannot attempt even to name the translators of the great hymns, beyond remarking that J. M. Neale's supremacy appears to be assured, only a few translators having approached his combination of glowing spiritual intensity with natural taste and skill. The Latin Hymns of the Western Church are really a vast collection. The student who wants to study them must look into the well-known collection of Daniel (*Thesaurus Hymnologicus*) or Mone (*Hymni Latini Medii Aevi*) or explore that enormous library, the *Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi*, edited by G. M. Dreves, C. Blume, and H. M. Bannister, in fifty-five volumes. Valuable as this huge corpus of Christian hymns is, it may be said that the fittest of them have survived in the breviaries, liturgies and hymnaries of the Church. The whole range of Christian Latin poetry has been recently treated by F. J. Raby in his *History of Christian Latin Poetry*, a well-documented study which bears evidence of wide knowledge and careful research and leaves us grateful for its wealth of information, even when we feel that the scale of his historical survey necessitates in certain periods a selective rather than a detailed treatment of his material.

For the earlier period of the Western Church—roughly from Hilary of Poitiers to the age of Charles the Great who died in 814, our best guide is the collection of *Early Latin Hymns* (Cambridge Patristic Texts), edited with introduction and notes by the late A. S. Walpole. Left unfinished owing to the author's untimely death, it owes much to the scholarly revision of Dr. A. J. Mason, an expert in Latin hymnology, who with notes and additional matter prepared the book for the press. It opens with the hymn of Hilary of Poitiers, *Hymnum dicat turba fratrum, hymnum cantus personet*, which is taken from the Hymnal of the ancient Irish Church. To Hilary, who died in 358, quite a number of hymns of the Ambrosian mode used to be ascribed: but the Italian scholar, Gamurrini, who discovered portions of Hilary's *Book of Hymns and Mysteries* embedded in a narrative of a pious lady's pilgrimage, has proved that the three fragments there discovered are in classical metres, two of them in the trochaic measure of the *Hymnum dicat turba*, which shows the predominance of accent over quantity. Hilary, therefore, may be claimed as an adherent to a principle which had already found its way into Latin Christian poetry. The barbarous hexameters of Commodianus of Gaza (c. 250) are really a sort of metrical prose in that the classical rules of prosody are flung to the winds. Similar, too, are the three *Hymni de Trinitate* of that interesting theologian whom Augustine revered, Marius Victorinus Afer (c. 350). Raby does not refer to these hymns, which are *ametri et anarhythmi*.* The second is a kind of litany: here is an extract :

Miserere, Domine, miserere, Christe : amavi mundum quia tu mundum feceras : detenus mundo sum dum invidet mundus tuis : nunc odi mundum quia nunc percepi Spiritum.

They are, in fact, Christian psalms, intended, perhaps, for catechumens. The third has the apostrophe *o beata Trinitas* after each clausula or strophe: e.g., it closes with the words—

Libera nos et salva nos, justifica nos, o beata Trinitas.

Clearly these poems make no pretension to metrical form even to the extent of Augustine's *Psalmus contra Donatistas*, which is composed in lines of sixteen syllables with well-marked accentual features peculiar to itself.

The fact is that, while the classical metres persisted—as witness the *Historia Evangelica* of Juvencus, who in the early fourth century with his excellent hexameters wrought the

* Cf. Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, viii.; *Proleg.*, p. 1000.

gospel story into a kind of Christian *Aeneid*, and the neat inscriptional verse to saints and martyrs produced by Damasus who was bishop of Rome in 366—rude attempts had been made to break with the classical tradition in favour of a looser type of psalmody which disregarded the laws of quantity and created a metrical prose with well-marked *ictus* or cadence. These experiments corresponded with the vogue of the *Itala* version of the Old Testament at a time when Greek was gradually being superseded by Latin in the Western Empire. Greek hymns and psalms like the *Gloria in Excelsis* were translated into Latin, and in the province of Africa, where Tertullian created a new Latinity to be followed later by a greater thinker than himself, Augustine, the triumph of Latin was inevitable, while the appearance of the Vulgate towards the close of the fourth century was to fix Latin as the language of worship and sacrament, instruction and preaching in the Church for centuries to come.

Nothing, however, in the form of a hymn, compact, simple, and dignified, had appeared until Ambrose in 386 created it. Everyone knows the thrilling passage in Augustine's *Confessions* in which the account of the origin is given. Not without emotion Augustine, who is our most valuable authority on the Ambrosian hymns, recounts the happy inspiration of the Bishop which moved him to relieve the tedium of the faithful orthodox gathered within the church at Milan and awaiting the entry of the Arians under the Empress Justina, by making them sing hymns of his own composing. Augustine rounds off the story with a sort of solemn apostrophe: "From that day to this it (the custom) has been retained and many, I might say, all of thy flocks throughout the rest of the world now follow our example."

Augustine quotes four of his hymns, which may, therefore, be regarded as unquestionably genuine: *Aeterne rerum conditor*, *Deus Creator omnium*, *Iam surgit hora tertia*, and, *Intende qui regis Israel*. According to Walpole and Biraghi we may add ten more to this list, with reasonable confidence in their authenticity, and with four others of less assured genuineness we may bring up the list to eighteen. This number amply enables us to judge of their form and character. Ambrose used the iambic dimeter, four lines to a strophe, a metre popularized by the comic dramatists, Plautus and Terence, although in their hands the four-footed form is extended in dialogue to double the length: actually, however, Ambrose's form is peculiar to himself, although it is found in alternate lines of Horace's first Epoche: *Beatus ille qui procul negotiis*. It is admirably adapted to a musical accompaniment which the author had in

view. Take, for example, the hymn which Augustine sang to himself on hearing of his mother's death:

*Deus creator omnium
polique rector, vestiens
diem decoro lumine,
noctem soporis gratia.*

The words are so simple that he who runs may read; but in a later strophe there is a line which shows that the classical rules of quantity may be abandoned in favour of accent: *te diligat castus amor*, the short syllable being lengthened before the vowel of the following word. The beat or *ictus* is henceforth in the Latin hymn more important than quantity, which may be ignored, while rhyme begins to show itself, as in the third and fourth lines of another strophe:

*fides tenebras nesciat
Et nox fide reluceat.*

But clearly its use is accidental in Ambrose. There is no reason why it should not at once have been adopted: for rhymes—medial and final—are to be found in Ennius, Virgil, Ovid and other poets.* It is not an essentially Christian device, as it has sometimes been held to be. Indeed, Meyer confidently claims that it is of Semitic origin and known to the Arabs. Be that as it may, it appears in Christian prose—e.g., in Cyprian and Augustine—in moments of heightened emotion, and thence passed naturally into Christian poetry. But at first it was sparingly used, and the transition to the rhymed hymn of the Middle Ages was only gradual. The Ambrosian mode, therefore, is like Horace's Pyrrha, *simplex munditiis*, neat and wholesome in its clean-cut outlines. The movement is slow and dignified, not gay and tripping like the trochaic measure of Venantius Fortunatus. Who can help being excited by his *Pange lingua gloriosi proelium certaminis?* But Ambrose's metre—short-lined and methodical and somewhat monotonous—is suited to a plainsong, while the matter of his hymns was such as to appeal to the average Christian of those days brought up on the knowledge of the chief doctrines of the faith. He echoes the Nicene Creed even in his simple morning hymns. The day is symbolic of the Advent which puts to flight the powers of darkness. The facts of the Incarnate life appear almost in a mnemonic form in a strophe like—

*Egressus eius a Patre,
regressus eius ad Patrem,
excursus usque ad inferos,
recursus ad sedem Dei.*

* Cf. Raby, *Christian Latin Poetry*, p. 22 ff., for examples.

This was the type of hymn that could be "understood of the people," never recondite in its allusiveness or too elaborate in its imagery, recalling the austere lines of an Ionic temple rather than a richly ornamented Gothic cathedral. It is the quality which belongs to the greatest of our hymns, like "O God, our Help," or "When I survey." Recently* the present writer pointed out that these and other hymns which might be quoted really carry on the Ambrosian tradition and could easily be remoulded into a Latin form—e.g., "When I survey" goes naturally into

*Contemplor ut miram crucem
qua mortuus rex gloriae,
summas opes damnum puto
et omne contemno decus.*

But there is one great difference which this example clearly illustrates. The modern hymn-writer does not hesitate to use the first person as the expression of the individual soul in prayer, confession, penitence, and the like, while Ambrose's hymns are invariably corporate in their aspiration. Xavier's *O Deus, ego amo te* belongs to a later age: the earlier period voices the worship of a congregation or group of worshippers.

In Prudentius, Ambrose's contemporary, a native of Saragossa and born about 348, we have a loyal adherent to the classical tradition. All we know of him is contained in the self-disclosure of his *Praefatio* to the *Cathemerinon*, a collection of hymns for the Christian's day. As ardent an imperialist and lover of Rome as Claudio, who may be called the poet laureate of his age, or Ausonius of Bordeaux in the succeeding century, he experienced, unlike them, a definite conversion to Christianity, and became as loyal and deeply convinced a Christian as Paulinus of Nola, the friend of Ausonius. Prudentius, after a period of military service, had become a lawyer, and his retirement from his profession may have coincided with his conversion about the age of fifty. In a spirit of penitential regret for the errors of the past, he consecrates his gifts to Christ. Why not employ the forms of Horace and Virgil in order to glorify the Saviour of mankind? Could there be a better medium for so great a task? So he replies:

Let each day link itself with grateful hymns
And every night re-echo songs of God:
Yea, be it mine to fight all heresies,
Unfold the meanings of the Catholic faith,
Trample on Gentile rites, thy gods, O Rome,
Dethrone, the Martyrs laud, the Apostles sing.†

* See art. on "The Ambrosian Hymn," London *Quarterly Review*, July, 1929.

† From the edition of *Hymns of Prudentius*, by the present writer and R. F. Davis (Temple Classics: Dent).

Our concern is not with his theological poems, treatises on the *Freedom of the Will*, the *Origin of Evil*, and *Deification*, nor with his *Battle of the Soul*, nor yet with the *Peristephanon*, lyrics on the crowns of the martyrs which are full of interest for students of fourth-century thought, church art and architecture—all wrought with an admirable mastery of the technique of Latin poetry and with real touches of beauty and power. Rather let us look at his *Hymns for the Day*, which have provided for the liturgies and breviaries of the Church many well-known and often quoted Christian lyrics. It is a set of poems rather than hymns: but the excerpts—as, for example, the six office hymns selected by the *English Hymnal*—make excellent little hymns complete in themselves. In one or two of the hymns Prudentius adopts the Ambrosian metre: but the rest are in sapphics, trochaics, and other metrical forms which reveal his admirable talent. There is a brightness and glow in his style—possibly a heritage of his race—but surely not unconnected with the joy of the early Christian, *non dissolute hilaris*. His knowledge of the Old and New Testaments and the Apocryphal books is remarkable: clearly their wealth of picturesque stories, legends, and wonders appealed to his imagination. He is a lover of nature and art: he knew the Catacombs, and is a valuable authority on the pictures and monuments of the early Christian churches in Rome. It has been suggested that his *Dittochaeon*—quatrains on Old and New Testament figures and incidents—were written as inscriptions for pictures, thus making a parallel series from both Testaments. The compilers of the *English Hymnal* have apportioned nine hymns each to Ambrose and Prudentius—a sound selection; but one could have wished that in the famous hymn for the Burial of the Dead, *Deus igne fons animarum*, room could have been found for the homely touches of such stanzas as the following for sorrowing parents:

*Iam maesta quiesce querella,
lacrimas suspendite, matres,
nullus sua pignora plangat,
mors haec reparatio vitae est.*

And for those who piously tend the tomb of the departed:

*nos tecta fovebimus ossa
violis et fronde frequenti,
titulumque et frigida saxa
liquido spargemus odore.*

Prudentius was held in veneration by succeeding generations as the first Christian poet, and was a model to those who in the Middle Ages refused to abandon the classical forms in their

poetical exercises on all themes whether sacred or secular; but the best of them—even a Hildebert or a Marbod—did not surpass him either in technique or warmth of spiritual emotion.

As a matter of fact, Venantius Fortunatus, Bishop of Poitiers, born more than a century after the death of Prudentius, alone can be compared with him as a Christian poet and hymn-writer who maintained the old forms of expression. The fifth century is distinguished by the names of Paulinus of Nola, the friend and correspondent of that genial humanist Ausonius of Bordeaux, and a man of letters whose poetic gifts, though not equal to that of his friend, enabled him nevertheless to produce poems on saints and martyrs which have charmed his readers by their devotional spirit; and with Paulinus we may link Sedulius, who wrote in hexameters one great poem, the *Carmen Paschale*—an attempt like that of Juvencus to interest the pagan reader in both the mythology and history of the Christian gospels. He also composed an alphabetical poem of which the first line is *A solis ortus cardine*, dealing with the events of the life of Christ. Two office hymns which are found in the *English Hymnal* were extracted from this poem to be sung at Christmas and Epiphany. They are in the Ambrosian metre, with rhyme used more freely than their model, but irregularly. Ennodius, a devoted lover of rhetoric and a relative of the famous Boëthius, author of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, was no great hymn-writer, his best effort being the Ascension hymn *Iam Christus ascendit polum* of the Ambrosian type. And here we may mention the hymn *Aurea luce et decore roseo* (E.H. 226), said to have been composed by Elpis, the wife of Boëthius: this is doubtful; but if Elpis is a woman's name, she, whoever she was, is the first of woman hymn-writers. Among the Gallic poets of the fifth century is Orientius, the Bishop of Auch (*Augusta Auscianorum*), who receives a place in the *Hundred Best* with an extract from his Nature-hymn of praise to God, beginning *Tibi que, Domine, caelum Cherubim vindicant*. He writes in iambic trimeters, with a refrain after every three lines:

*Et nos imago consonantis cantici
Amen sonamus, Alleluia dicimus.*

But it was one of the great merits of Venantius Fortunatus, whom Dill in his latest volume on Roman Society in Gaul treats with a marked lack of sympathy, to give the world “a sacramental vision of the natural order”; as, for example, in the famous *Pange lingua*, where the Tree of the Cross towers above the trees of the forest:

*Crux fidelis inter omnes arbor una nobilis,
Nulla talem silva profert flore, fronde, germine.*

And we may link with this his famous picture of spring greeting with new attire the risen Lord—a poem almost modern in its sense of “something far more deeply interfused,” as if nature herself were undergoing a rebirth:

*ecce renascentis testatur gratia mundi
omnia cum domino dona redisse suo.*

It is hardly necessary to mention his great processional hymn *Vexilla regis prodeunt* and his *Crux benedicta nitet*; but it may not be realized that probably to his authorship is to be ascribed the fine Incarnation hymn beginning *Quem terra, pontus, aethera,* and ending with the call to the nations:

*vitam datam per virginem
gentes redemptae plaudite.*

The fifth and three following centuries witnessed rich and varied developments in Christian poetry and hymnology coincident with the Church's missionary movement and the rise of religious houses in all parts of Western Europe. Spain under Isidore of Seville produces the Mozarabic liturgy; Ireland, distinguished by great names such as Patrick and Columba, author of the famous *Altus prosator*, compiles a *Liber Hymnorum*; and England, with Bede at Jarrow and Aldhelm at Canterbury, contributes in classical metres to Christian poetry and hymns. Within this period we must place a number of hymns Ambrosian in form (most of them in the E.H.), such as *Lucis largitor splendide* (formerly ascribed to Hilary), *Aeterne lucis conditor*, *Fulgentis auctor aetheris*, *Christe qui lux es et dies*, hymns for the monastic hours, festival hymns like *Conditor alme siderum* and *Verbum supernum prodiens* (a first line borrowed by Thomas Aquinas for one of his great Eucharistic hymns), hymns of the Last Judgment like *Apparebit repentina dies magna Domini*, anticipating the *Dies Iræ*, and in praise of the New Jerusalem like *Urbs beata Ierusalem dicta pacis visio*, belonging, perhaps, to the seventh century and, as Walpole says, “the ultimate source of inspiration” of many successors. The great ordination hymn, *Veni Creator Spiritus* of uncertain authorship, cannot have been composed before the ninth century.

The *Te Deum* is now confidently ascribed to Nicetas of Remesiana in Dacia, a bishop who visited Paulinus of Nola, whose writings are our only source of information about this author of the greatest of Christian hymns (or rather sequences, for that is its real form), crystallizing, as it does, the spirit of the first five centuries of Christianity. It reminds us that the Latin hymn is essentially theological. Ethical aspects of the

faith find expression, but Christian conduct is based on the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion. Latin is pre-eminently the language of authority in law, government and religion. Its strength and terseness, its power of compressing much into few words, its lapidary quality in contrast with the rich flexibility of Greek, the language of freedom and idealism, of thought and science, are features which admirably fit it to be the medium of liturgical hymn, prayer, and sacrament. The Roman Communion has never abandoned it as the authoritative expression of its faith, while recognizing the place of the vernacular in all other relations of life: and it is when we read the Latin hymns in the original, or hear the Creed set to the music of Bach's *Mass in B minor*, that we feel the historic greatness and attested power of Latin in the evolution of Western Christianity. The vernacular triumphed in the end as the medium of Christian praise, but not before the Middle Ages had produced the crowning glories of Latin hymnology, some aspects of which we may be permitted to review in a subsequent study.

R. MARTIN POPE.

GOD AND SPIRIT*

A VERY earnest but rather nebulous lady once defined her creed to me in these words: "I feel there is a spiritual something somewhere." And I suppose everyone but a stark materialist—if such a person still exists—would be able to subscribe to that. The difficulty begins when we are asked to be more precise; for the truth is that the word "spirit" represents an unfixed concept, which suggests much but tells little—an attempt to crystallize a profound intuition, not define something to which we have attained by logical thought. At one end of the scale it refers to the nature of Absolute Being, in so far as Absolute Being is apprehended by us; and at the other end to a quality or potentiality in ourselves, which constitutes our kinship with Absolute Being—or, to put it in more genial terms, our Divine sonship.

The New Testament gives us two apparently distinct but really complementary definitions of God, the ultimate Reality, which are specially relevant here, and may help us to clarify our thoughts. I put first the words attributed to Our Lord by the fourth evangelist—"God is Spirit." Next, the term which certainly was commonly used by Him, and constantly repeated

* Paper read at the Anglican Fellowship Conference, Oxford, July, 1930.

by the Synoptists—"Our Heavenly Father." If the first lifts us far beyond the world of space and time as it is normally present to our consciousness, the second assures us of an intimate, a filial relationship between the human creature anchored to this planet and that Fount and Origin of things who transcends the world of space and time. If the first opens the door alike to mystical and sacramental religion—for only the most spiritual, most awe-struck and unearthly conception of God can face the humbling truth of His self-giving through things—the second finds a place for the unexhaustibly deep and mysterious doctrines of Providence and Divine Love, those dearest treasures of the religious soul. Realistically understood, they complete each other; and set the scene for a full, rich, and dynamic spiritual experience, alike in the individual and in the Church.

Neither of these expressions, of course, is peculiar to Christianity. All that they mean is already implied in the Psalms and the Prophets. But each achieves in Christianity a new expansion and richness of content; and were their implications fully understood by us, we should be in possession of a far deeper and fuller conception than we generally reach of the three primary data of religion—God, Man, and the relation between God and Man. First: "God is Spirit." We may gloss this with the definition of St. Thomas: "The Holy Spirit is God, as He is everywhere and at all times." You remember how St. Teresa said that it marked an epoch in her spiritual life when she learned that God is present in and with us in Himself; and not, as she had been told, merely by His grace. And the trend of modern theology is towards abolishing the verbal distinction between the Spirit and grace. Secondly; this everywhere-present God is our Heavenly Father. Beyond succession, in the eternal world, our small created spirits somehow originated with Him, owe their being to Him, and depend utterly on Him. All these statements lie, as it were, on the surface of our subject; but before we can really get to grips with them, we still have to face that fundamental question which met us at the beginning—What is spirit?—and the more we look at it, the more we realize it is a question we cannot answer. Yet surely the wonderful thing about human nature is that we can ask it. Those words, "spirit" and "spiritual," stand for something veritably experienced by us, "dimly yet vividly," as von Hügel says; something not truly clear to the logical levels of the mind, which are quite unable to think Absolutes, something which is known on the whole more richly by intuition than by thought—yet something which is certainly real and fundamental to our human world. Some hint of what

these conceptions can mean to a fully expanded religious sense is given us, I think, by two passages from von Hügel; which contain in themselves the very essence of the theology of the Spirit. First this:

The central conviction and doctrine of Christianity is the real prevenience and condescension of the real God—the penetration of spirit into sense, of the spaceless into space, of the Eternal into time, of God into man.

That links, you see, the Incarnation, Pentecost, Sanctity, the Church, as parts of one Divine method and act.

Then this:

Spirit and spirit, God and the creature, are not two material bodies, of which one can only be where the other is not; but, on the contrary, as regards our own spirit, God's Spirit ever works in closest penetration and stimulation of our own; just as, in return, we cannot find God's Spirit simply separate from our own spirit within ourselves. Our spirit clothes and expresses His; His Spirit first creates and then sustains and stimulates our own.

There we have again the three data of religion: the absolute Spirit God, the derived spirit Man, and the relation between His Spirit and our own. And we can best deal with the subject under those three heads. "God's Spirit ever works in closest penetration and stimulation of our own." To realise that, delight in it, rest on it, suffer for it—this is the perfection of a spiritual life.

This doctrine of God's penetration of the soul is not to be suspected as a disguised pantheism. No theologian of the modern world has been more consistent and emphatic than von Hügel in his warnings concerning the impoverishment and perversion of the religious sense which comes from opening the door to any kind of pantheistic monism. These words are the words of a teacher intensely concerned to safeguard those twin truths of the distinctness of God and the derivative being of man, without which we can never hope to construct a sane and realistic, because humble and creaturely, theology of the spirit. The pendulum swing of religious experience and religious thought has tended sometimes to overstress one, and sometimes the other, of these twin truths. Sometimes it is God's utter distinctness which is overwhelmingly felt; and the result is virtual or actual Deism. Sometimes it is His immanence in, and total possession of, the soul; and this, unbalanced by its completing opposite, prepares the way for that pantheism which ever lies in wait for the exclusive mystic. Christian theology ought to safeguard us against both these extremes. The solemn awe with which we abase ourselves

before the *numen*, and the humble and loving response of human nature in its totality to the Divine Nature incarnate in Christ, is completed by the veritable experience of a Spirit of Love and Will which, says the Creed, proceeds both from the unmanifest and the manifest Godhead, the Father and the Son—a source of energy, and also a personal influence. When we speak of Spirit in this sense, we speak of a free and active Reality which transcends and yet penetrates our world, our activity, and our consciousness; not merely as something which is in the making, the soul of an evolving universe, but as something which is there first, and which draws its transforming power from the fact that it is already perfect and holy. Here, then, by the Spirit we mean God Himself in His reality and love, His intimately cherishing care for His whole creation. Not part of the striving evolutionary process, but distinct; and therefore able to intervene, able to pour out veritable dowers of life and light, and reveal actual but unguessed levels of realness, beyond the level which we call the natural world.

Thus the genuine Christian doctrine of God as Spirit can never be translated into terms of emergent evolution or other process; because it is of the very essence of Christian philosophy to hold that Spirit in its absolute perfection and living plenitude is there first, that the Creative Principle infinitely exceeds, while it informs, the created—and this not merely in degree, but also in kind. “With thee is the well of life”—the prime originating cause—and “in thy light we see light.” Hence, while Christianity can accept and spiritualize the evolutionary account of process, it cannot accept as complete the evolutionary account of cause. Beyond and within the natural it requires the supernatural, if all that has been revealed to it is to be expressed. “The world is charged with the grandeur of God,” said Gerard Hopkins.

“There lives the dearest freshness deep down things
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
World broods, with warm breast and with ah ! bright wings.”

The warm breast, fount of creative and cherishing life, turned earthwards; the bright wings, spread out upon another, a transcendent, free and perfect order of existence, and reflecting the radiance of eternity—surely a wonderful image of the Divine double action and the Divine double love. It contains within itself much of what we mean, or should mean, by Spirit. So we see that though it is quick, easy and very popular to say that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is simply a doctrine of the immanence of God, unless we are careful in our discriminations this may mean slurring some of the most significant and necessary outlines drawn by religion. The full and genuine

Christian doctrine means the immanence of an Absolute Spirit who yet remains utterly transcendent—the Wholly Other, inspiring and supporting His creature in every detail and at every point. That aspect of our relationship to God is wonderfully given by Plotinus, in a passage where his religious intuition seems to intervene and cut decisively across his more rigid and doctrinaire diagram of reality, to anticipate the experiences of the saints.

"We must not," he says, "think of ourselves as cut off from the Source of life; rather we breathe and consist in It, for It does not give Itself to us and then withdraw Itself, but *ever lifts and bears us.*" Thus the fact that our awareness of Spirit is so limited, fluctuating and sporadic is seen to be comparatively unimportant. The emphasis lies on God, the Fact of all Facts, and His action; not on the partial experiences of our uneven, tentative and many-levelled consciousness, still so uncertain in its grasp of all that lies beyond the world of sense. For the doctrine of the Holy Spirit means that we acknowledge and adore the everywhere present pressure of God; not as a peculiar religious experience, not as a grace or influence sent out from another world or order, but as a personal holy Presence and Energy, in this world and yet distinct from it, penetrating all, yet other than all, the decisive factor in every situation; operating at various levels, and most deeply and freely in that world of souls where His creation shows a certain kinship with Himself. That is the Christian landscape. That is the situation within which the Christian soul is required to grow in love and power, be purified, and become at last itself a creative spirit, an instrument of that God who is Pure Act. So man's progress in spirituality, his growth into correspondence with God, will be felt at its deepest far more as a response to that Spirit's incitement, an increasing surrender to the subtle pressure of that love "*which ever lifts and bears us*" than as a self-actualized adventure, a pilgrim's progress from this world to that which is to come. It will mean such a self-abandonment to the Spirit that we become its unresisting agents, and can receive from moment to moment the needed impulsions and lights. This is what the spiritual life has always seemed to the greatest, humblest, most enlightened souls; whatever symbols they may use in their effort to communicate it. It is *God* who worketh *in us*—that is the overruling truth which should colour and harmonize all the various strands of our religious life.

Now turn from these thoughts of God, the Absolute Spirit in whom we live and move and have our being, to man the created spirit; for spirit is a word that we can and must apply to human

personality. It is a platitude that man is amphibious, a creature of the borderland. He cannot be explained in physical terms alone, or spiritual terms alone; but partakes of both worlds. But, like many other so-called platitudes, this one conveys a stupendous truth which is seldom fully realized by us: the truth of our unique status, our capacity for God. Man's relation to the animal world needs no demonstration. A stroll round the Zoo reveals plenty of disconcerting family likenesses. A very little introspection discovers animal instincts, politely disguised, in control of our normal behaviour. Yet a certitude, an experience of another world and level of life, in contact with our deepest selves, and a craving to actualize that other world and other life, grows with our growth, our increase in spiritual sensitiveness. No psychology which leaves this out can cover the ground of human action and human desire. We can and do habitually sink very much lower than the angels; yet we are crowned with glory and honour in our brothers and sisters the saints.

Certainly our conscious hold on this spiritual heritage is still far less clear and certain than our hold on our physical heritage. Our powers have been developed in close contact with the senses, and by the pressure of the physical world. Clear correspondence with the other order must be the prerogative of a minority of souls. So here again religion is justified in her insistence that what matters supremely is the hold which the spiritual order has on *us*, and the power which flows from it through surrendered and self-oblivious personalities; in other words, that the initiative ever lies with God and His Spirit. All that is asked from man's small emerging spirit is that devotedness, confidence and faithful response which makes him a channel of the inpouring supernatural energy; strong in the Lord and the power of His might.

Nevertheless, as we get accustomed to our own psychology, we also get accustomed to the fact—however we express it—that our being has its metaphysical aspect. We are not all of a piece. Those statements which are so frequent in spiritual literature, concerning the contrast between our higher and lower nature, or about the soul's ground or apex, that deep core of our being where God dwells and speaks—all these have a genuine meaning and refer to a profound truth, in spite of their manifestly symbolic form.

"All year long upon the stage
I dance and tumble and do rage,
So furiously I scarcely see
The inner and eternal Me."

The inner and eternal Me—Spirit, the metaphysical self, that most hidden and intimate seat of our being, where already we

live in a measure eternal life; the height or depth at which we taste God, the real seat of the religious instinct. There His Spirit works in intimate union with our spirit; there are felt the moulding effects of His pressure, as it comes to us through circumstance. And the surrender which all deep and real religion requires of us is needed, in order that we may become perfect and unresisting tools and channels of that abundant Divine life.

Now let us take another point. The term Spirit represents our awareness of a level of Reality, and also a level of the soul's life, at which the all-penetrating God makes Himself known to His creature. Not only this, but it tells us something, too, about our own personality. We are created spirits; that is the most real thing about us. As the mystics say, when we ascend to the summit of our being, *then* we are spirit. "Though the soul," says St. Teresa, "is known to be undivided, interior effects show for certain that there is a positive difference between the soul and the spirit, even though they are one with each other."

"Two worlds immense
Of spirit and of sense
Wed
In this narrow bed."

And you will remember how von Hügel says, in one of the passages I quoted,

We cannot find God's Spirit simply separate from our own spirit within ourselves. Our spirit clothes and expresses His; His Spirit first creates and then sustains and stimulates our own.

Our spirit, so tenuous, unstable, half-real, is yet intended for this incredible office—to clothe and express within the space-time world the Absolute Spirit of God, the One Reality. For this purpose, that Absolute Spirit creates the universe of dependent spirits; and then sustains and stimulates them. Sustains, and stimulates. Notice those words. They are not chosen haphazard; they represent two distinct groups of experiences, in which we recognize the direct action of God on souls. First that steady support which, as Plotinus says, "ever bears us," whether we notice it or not: as true an operation of the Holy Spirit as any abnormal manifestation, or "charismatic" gifts. Next that insistent pressure, reaching us sometimes through outward events, sometimes by interior ways, which urges us forward on the spiritual path, incites us to those particular efforts, struggles and sacrifices, through which we grow up in the supernatural life. This double action of God's infinite Spirit on man's finite spirit is reflected in our characteristic religious practices; on one hand the solid objective

support, and on the other the stimulus to costly action, which we seek and should find through the life of prayer and sacraments. Here we come up against the fundamental paradox of the spiritual life—the fact that it requires from us an utter self-abandonment to the sustaining power, and stimulates us to a vigorous personal initiative; and that this balance, this tension, in which our human action becomes part of the deep action of God, can only be understood by us as we enter more and more into our spiritual inheritance. Pentecost is the great historic manifestation of this twin truth. There we see on one hand the utter dependence of the small creature-spirits on the Infinite Life. On the other hand, the self-obvious courage and initiative, the unlimited confidence and hope of those same creatures, called to incarnate something of that Infinite Spirit's life; and able to do so, because in their measure they partake of the life of spirit as well as the life of sense. As we watch life, we realize how deeply this paradox does enter into all great action; and not only that which we recognize as religious. We are simultaneously conscious of a genuine costly personal effort and risk, *and* of a mighty enveloping power. This double strain is present in all history; though perhaps specially clear in the religious history of man. The saints are not examples of limp surrender; but of dynamic personality using all its capacities, and acting with a freedom, originality and success which result from an utter humility, complete self-loss in the Divine life. In them supremely, will and grace rise and fall together; the action of the Spirit stimulates as well as sustains, requiring of them vigorous and often heroic action, and carrying them through apparently impossible tasks. No man was ever more fully and consciously mastered by the Spirit than St. Paul; and we know what St. Paul's life was like. The same is true of St. Francis, St. Catherine of Siena, St. Vincent de Paul. "The human will," says Dr. Temple, "is a more adequate instrument of the Divine will than any natural force." Even more truly we might say that the human spirit is the most adequate instrument known to us of the Holy Spirit of God—the active energy of the Divine Love operating in time.

So we have slid into the third division of our subject: the relation between the human spirit and God's Spirit—a relation so wonderfully expressed by St. Thomas when he says, "the Holy Spirit not only brings God into our soul, but places us *in* God." These examples and declarations show us that the true working of that Holy Spirit on human personality should never be identified with abnormal phenomena or cataclysmic conversions. We have no reason to suppose that the supernatural world is less steady, less dependable than the

natural world. The gifts which theology attributes to the action of the Holy Spirit on the human psyche are all steady, quiet things; a deepening and enrichment marked, not by any emotional reaction, but by an increase of awe, wisdom, knowledge, insight, strength. Anything abrupt or sensational in our realization of Spirit is rather to be attributed to our weakness and instability, our sense-conditioned psychic life, than to the deep and quiet operation of the Power of God. In Acts we have the double record of those moments when the Spirit was felt as an invading and transfiguring power, in sharp contrast with the ordinary levels of experience, and the continuous action and growth of individuals and groups indwelt by Him. And so with us. There may be italicized periods of either joy or abasement, when the reality and claim of God are suddenly and violently felt, and the Spirit seizes the field of consciousness; and throughout the whole spiritual course, for some temperaments, moments of communion when His presence is vividly experienced, and His direct guidance is somehow recognized. But what matters far more is the continuous normal action, the steady sober growth which the Spirit evokes, and cherishes if we are faithful: the whole life of correspondence between man the creature and the Absolute Will.

So what we call the "coming of the Holy Spirit" does not mean any change in the nature and working of God; but does mean a change in the attitude and capacity of men. "Your opening and His entering," said Meister Eckhart, "are one moment." The New Testament shows us men's experience of Christ as opening a door for the further experience of the energizing Spirit of God, "as He is everywhere and at all times"; and ordinary human beings moving out to the very frontiers of human experience, to become channels of that Spirit's action in space and time. Since we are part of the society to which this happened and can happen still, our own responsibility as agents of Spirit is both individual and corporate; and each reacts on the other. Church and soul are both temples of the living Reality of God. Prayer is the responsive moving-out of soul and of Church, to the Spirit whose first movement has initiated this marvellous intercourse between the finite and infinite life.

So we arrive at this position: If the substantial reality of the human soul abides in that quality or *ens* we call Spirit, and if here, at its spire-point as Peter Sterry said, it finds God dwelling and its own real abiding-place in Him—two sides of one truth—then, the winning of men for God, the establishment of His Kingdom, consists in introducing them into this life of Spirit. It means the realized dwelling of imperfect man

in God the Perfect, with all its attendant possibilities, obligations and joys. This is what evangelization really is. It is giving the little human creature the good news of its real situation; not merely asking it to accept certain extraneous beliefs. If we look first at the highest apprehension of God's Being reached by the human soul, and then at existence as understood by the average sense-conditioned mind, the distance between these points is the sphere open to evangelization. For evangelization means showing every man what his possibilities in God really are: showing him that he *can* incarnate that Spirit which is eternal life, can become its tool and channel—and that he has not risen to the height of his own nature, is not fully alive, until he does this. Every human being, said Peguy, represents a hope of God—in less poetic terms, every human being is a potential spiritual personality. The job of the Christian teacher is to help it to become an actual spiritual personality, by the enlargement of its capacity for God. The Church is a society of souls, either doing this work, or on whom this work is being done; and who form together, in a special sense, a dwelling place, an embodiment for the Holy Eternal Spirit in space and time—*Corpus Christi*.

Nevertheless, it is inherent in the plasticity of life, our limited freedom, that our own side of this august correspondence is really left to us. We can enter more fully into the Order of God, here and now, or we can more and more decline from it: and the promotion of the Kingdom means, above all, the surrender of individual souls to His individual impulsions, that He may act. Where this surrender is absolute, the mighty creative energy evokes, develops and uses to the last drop the creature's energy. It is knit up into the great Divine action, and the result is such an amazing transcendency, such converting and creating power as we see in the saints; whose spirit, as von Hügel said, "clothes and expresses" the Spirit of God. It is within this supernatural economy that our little activities, religious and other, go forward; and it is this solemn consciousness of Spirit, in its fulness always remaining inexpressible, which is the mark of the really religious man.

We know the mysterious power of influence between man and man; know it so well that we seldom pause to think of its strangeness and significance—how decisively it witnesses against any theory of the soul as an independent monad. Yet this interpenetration of human spirits is a mere shadow of the deep and actual penetration and influence of God on souls. That fact is the ground and sanction of all personal religion. Were it disproved, personal religion would go too. And though news of this steadfast creative action, this supporting and

stimulating presence of God must—like all our other news—enter the field of consciousness through the senses or the intellect, translating intuition into concepts and sensible signs, these only partly reveal and certify that deep ineffable action of Spirit upon and within our spirits, which is literally the life of our life. Beyond all that we can see, feel, think, or bear, beyond succession, beyond change, is God, the Fact of all Facts. And this abiding Fact of all Facts is in His nature Spirit, perfect and complete. And the human soul, subject to succession, not perfect, not complete, finds its true life and full power only in an ever-growing surrender to that rich and living Reality.

"The Divine action," said De Caussade, "floods the whole Universe; it bathes and penetrates all created things. Wherever they are, it is. It goes before them, it accompanies them, it follows them. We need but let ourselves be borne upon its waves."

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

We propose to publish during the autumn a series of reviews of the Report of the Lambeth Conference, of which the following have already been arranged:

- I. THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD. Dr. J. K. Mozley, Dr. C. C. J. Webb, and Canon Lilley.
- II. THE LIFE AND WITNESS OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. Canon Carnegie, the Master of Corpus, and the Rev. Paul Stacy.
- III. THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH. The Rev. E. R. Morgan and Rev. W. J. Peck.
- IV. THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION. The Archdeacon of Auckland.
- V. THE MINISTRY. Canon B. K. Cunningham and Deaconess E. M. Banks.
- VI. YOUTH AND ITS VOCATION. Canon Underhill.

Dr. Sparrow Simpson's book on the conversion of St. Augustine, which is reviewed below, makes an opportune appearance in the year when the 1,500th anniversary of his death is being celebrated; and Canon Lacey's review, the work of one of the most learned Augustinian scholars of our generation, must be regarded as our tribute in this Journal to the memory of the great Bishop of Hippo.

CORRESPONDENCE

SIR,

In these days when Reunion is so much in the hearts of all it is desirable that we should understand the position of those who differ from us. I beg, therefore, to be allowed to remove some serious misapprehensions to which Mr. Moss's reply to me in your August issue may give rise.

1. It is true that the setting apart of Ruling Elders under the Presbyterian system is sometimes spoken of as Ordination. The term, however, is incorrect. "Admission" is the correct word. Here, as everywhere, much depends upon how terms are defined or understood. No Presbyterian imagines that when the word Ordination is used in this connection it is used in the same sense as Ordination to the Ministry. It is never—in the Church of England, at any rate—performed by laying on hands as Mr. Moss has been "informed"—he does not say by whom. Moreover, Ordination to the Ministry must be a plurality of Presbyters "orderly associated," whose names are recorded as evidence that they themselves have been duly ordained and have commission to ordain.

2. As to elders being "empowered by the Minister in an emergency to preside at Communion," if this is ever done in the Presbyterian Church of England or anywhere, it is grossly illegal: it would never be tolerated, and has never been heard of, in the Church of Scotland. Any Minister

who so acted would be at once dealt with by his Presbytery. It is true that elders "distribute the Elements" at Communion. But they merely "distribute" the Elements which have been consecrated by the Minister: they are mere bearers. Further, as has often been laid down by Church Courts, though it is customary and convenient for this duty to be done by elders, it may be done by any communicant called so to act by the Minister in the absence of elders. This merely makes it clear that the "distribution" is no part of an elder's functions.

I am puzzled to know how Mr. Moss has been led to imagine that an elder has "power to admit to or repel from Communion." The Kirk Session, over which the Minister presides, and in which elders sit, has this power, as a Court, but no elder or group of elders has it.

3. I heard the speeches at Lausanne of Dr. Banninga and Dr. Fyfe, and I remember that what they said about Ordination not conveying grace was warmly repudiated by the representatives of the Church of Scotland. It is not to any body of Christians calling themselves Presbyterian that one must look for the norm of Presbyterian order and practice, but to the Church of Scotland. Presbyterianism is not a gradation of Church Courts: it is government by Presbyters. There are bodies which have courts called Presbyteries: that is one thing, but Presbyterianism is another.

4. Finally, let me say that no Presbyterian historian of any repute will be found to support the thesis that the Scottish Reformers intended "to make a clean break" with the Church Catholic. The very opposite was their constantly affirmed claim, as it has always been the claim of the Church of Scotland, the claim reaffirmed in the recent Articles Declaratory.

I am, etc.,

J. CROMARTY SMITH, D.D. (EDIN.).

NOTE

RELIGIOUS STATISTICS

THE new edition of *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, now in progress, contains some interesting statistics showing the comparative strength of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. In the latter is included Anglicanism, though, as is said in one place, this is true only with considerable reservations.

In 1800 in Europe outside Russia Catholics numbered 71 per cent.; they now number 60 per cent. An important cause of this retrogression is the relatively small increase of the population of Roman Catholic France.

Catholic missions in 1925 had just on 13,000,000 Christians, Protestants nearly eight and a half million. The Protestant communicants trebled between 1903 and 1925. There are approximately a million priests, monks and nuns of the Roman obedience.

Austria keeps very exact figures of religious changes. From 1919 to 1927 nearly 60,000 passed from Catholicism to Protestantism, the Evangelical Churches during that period losing 17,222.

In Germany the average yearly number crossing over to the Roman Church from the Evangelical during 1921-25 was about 7,000; the figure

for the reverse movement was about 11,000. The exact net gain of the Evangelicals during 1919-26 was 29,566. Mixed marriages, contrary to the general impression, work out to the detriment of the Roman Church. In 1926 the children of mixed marriages allotted to the Evangelical Church worked out at 56·9 per cent.

These figures are derived from a number of articles, notably that entitled "Kirchenaustritt." This of course in Germany absolves the departing person from the Church tax. In view of the small use made of facilities for worship by the Protestants, it is surprising that more have not left the Evangelical Churches. In the highly industrialized State of Saxony during 1919-26 the Evangelical Church lost 8·7 per cent. of its total membership, the Roman Church 12·31 of its (much smaller) membership. One writer points out that the rapid growth of great cities in the nineteenth century favoured Protestantism. In the twentieth century the birth-rate in great cities has fallen rapidly, whereas in Catholic districts it remains high.

The figures for Holland form an interesting conclusion. The Roman Catholic proportion of the population was as follows: 1849, 38·15 per cent.; 1909, 35·02 per cent.; 1920, 35·61 per cent. In 1920 the Protestant proportion fell substantially owing to the increase (from 4·97 to 7·77 per cent.) of those who returned "no religion."

No religious census is taken in France or (now) in Italy. The figures, so far as they go, show that Roman Catholicism is barely holding its own. If, instead of adherents, Sunday worshippers were counted, the comparison with Protestantism in predominantly Protestant countries would work out much more favourably to Roman Catholicism.

W. K. L. C.

REVIEWS

ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONVERSION: AN OUTLINE OF HIS DEVELOPMENT TO THE TIME OF HIS ORDINATION. By W. J. Sparrow Simpson, D.D. S.P.C.K. 10s. 6d.

The conversion of St. Augustine is an event of perennial interest. So much turns on it in the history of Christian thought, so much is known about it and yet remains obscure, that no attempted elucidation can be dismissed as superfluous. It may, however, be presumed that an attempt made in sympathy with the subject will be more profitable than a study made in a spirit of detachment. Where a crisis in a human soul has to be understood, some degree of similarity in experience will be a help to understanding, with which no acuteness of external observation can be compared. There lies the chief difficulty in appraising the great African convert. Among those who are capable of the task, how many have had a similar experience? We need not expect those who have known it to make their own confessions public after his fashion. An Englishman in particular will be slow to do it, but his own experience may be expected to colour his treatment of the subject.

In reading Dr. Sparrow Simpson's analytic study, I find myself asking whether he has deliberately made it as objective as possible. I do not mean that he is foolishly afraid of being sentimental. Indeed, there are passages in which he freely gives way to an inclination in that direction. The point is that he carefully maintains the attitude of an onlooker. For anything more intimate he goes to others. He quotes St. Theresa: "No sooner had I begun to read this book of the Confessions than I seemed to find myself depicted. . . . I read the words which he heard when in the garden. . . . It seemed to me that God had caused the same voice to sound in the depth of my own soul." That is one way of speaking about it. Dr. Sparrow Simpson's way is drier, but perhaps not less sincere.

Where he does seem to me deficient is in sympathy with Augustine's difficulties. He is more interested in the result of the long struggle than in the process. That is natural, for he is himself at the end attained. There is a familiar distinction which places Augustine in the category of the "twice-born." It is Christian rather in language than by intention, and Dr. Sparrow Simpson would perhaps reject it. He would, at all

events, place the second birth in the baptistery under the hands of Ambrose, not in the famous garden. He is careful, indeed, to insist that the conversion was not complete when Augustine returned from the garden to Alypius and read the words of St. Paul to which he was sent by the "Tolle! lege." And further, he continues his study to the time, five years later, of the strange and hurried ordination at Hippo. He is right; for it was certainly to the priesthood that Augustine, however unwillingly and shrinkingly, was summoned. All this ensures what I will call an objective treatment of the subject. Another may prefer to call it an ecclesiastical treatment. Augustine would not have thought the worse of it.

It is difficult to praise too highly the diligence—the dry and precise diligence—of Dr. Sparrow Simpson's work. He has read widely, but relies chiefly on Augustine's own presentment of his case. The evidence is full; but some of it has to be sought in unexpected corners of his writings. No man was ever more autobiographical—in letters, in treatises, and even in sermons. And yet the *Confessions* are not an autobiography, as Dr. Sparrow Simpson prudently observes: the book is "self-analysis in the form of a prayer," it is "one long, direct outpouring of the mind and heart to God." Its chronology is therefore defective, or rather chronology is disregarded. Reminiscences are called up as the self-analysis requires them, and there is little attempt at perspective; he sees the past always in the light of the present, and the result is at times a certain flatness of presentation. The conversion is thus made to seem instantaneous, completed by one stroke of divine grace. He passes at a bound from despair to serene confidence. The Retractations are here invaluable, for they show Augustine sitting in judgment on his writings of the ensuing period, and noting the progress which he had yet to make in the knowledge of God. Dr. Sparrow Simpson deprecates the question whether his conversion was intellectual or moral. The distinction seems to be invalid. Human nature is not departmental enough to afford room for it. Augustine had much to learn, and was rather slow in learning it; he had one great act of renunciation to make, and he hung back from it long after he was convinced of its necessity. In both respects he was by no means singular.

That act of renunciation is not, I think, perfectly understood by Dr. Sparrow Simpson. It is a mistake to think of the young Augustine as a libertine or lasciviously minded. His reproachful memories did not obscure the fact that he had found the wanton spectacles of the theatre rather disgusting than alluring. It was probably a matter of common form that as a mere boy he provided himself with a concubine, whether slave or free-

woman is not known. It stands to his credit that a very much unwanted child was accepted with affection and brought up as a recognized son. According to the standards of the time there was nothing shameful in such a connection, nor had Christian opinion yet travelled very far beyond those standards. St. Basil of Cæsarea had recently been ruling that even a married man could not be put to penance for adding to his wife a concubine. The pious Monnica does not seem to have judged her son at all severely. When she found for him a young wife at Milan, she may have had something to do with that dismissal of his son's mother which seems to us a graver moral fault than the connection, but about which he appears to be, in retrospection, quite callous. What did fill him with grief and shame was the discovery that he could not do without a woman—a need which was supplied as a matter of course pending the arrival of the bride-elect at a marriageable age. And the bride-elect afterwards drops out of sight without comment. We evidently must not read into the story of St. Augustine any of the more recent Christian sentiments about sexual relations. But these relations have a definite bearing on his conversion.

As a Manichæan, he had been debarred by his incapacity for continence from admission to the rank of the Elect. We may dismiss the Pelagian assumption of his ineradicable Manichæism, but a man does not easily throw off all the practical effects of long-continued error, and the Manichæan regard for sexual continence was independently supported by much orthodox Christian teaching about the State of Perfection. It is clear that Augustine was hungering for that state when the crisis of his conversion drew on. Hence his passionate cry "Da castitatem!" even though it broke down to "Modo, ecce modo: sine paullulum." His call was not only to Christian morality, but to the State of Perfection. He was like his friend Verecundus, who could not, as a married man, face the renunciations of baptism; and in the story of St. Paulinus of Nola we find a similar hesitation. His conversion was the effect of a conviction borne in upon him, that he could by grace overcome the lusts of the flesh—and not only its sinful lusts. In later years he would extol the chastity of marriage; and yet there was, perhaps, some truth in the suggestion of Pelagian critics that his more favoured theory about the transmission of original sin was a reminiscence of Manichæan sentiment. Reason and Authority, his two accepted guides, rescued him from all leaning to Manichæan doctrine, but ingrained sentiment it is more difficult to dislodge.

Reason and Authority were the instruments of his conversion. Dr. Sparrow Simpson puts them in this right order, but with

some wavering, and I am not quite satisfied with his treatment of either. A doubt emerges when in one passage he seems to identify Scepticism and Agnosticism. Agnosticism should always bear the meaning for which Huxley invented the term: a frank confession of ignorance or lack of conviction about certain specified subjects. The Scepticism of Augustine's Academics was a conviction that what men call knowledge in respect of all subjects alike is no more than opinion based on various degrees of probability. Huxley, the confessed Agnostic, was no Sceptic; his affirmations were positive and rather crude. Augustine was acquainted with Scepticism from his adolescence, when he read with delight—strangely mixed with *desiderium* for the name of Christ—the *Hortensius* of Cicero. His Manichæan teachers promised him proof positive—at all events when Faustus should appear on the scene. Augustine found him a wind-bag, whose dialectic was strong only on the negative side. He seems to have been effective—Dr. Sparrow Simpson is luminous here—in demolishing what Augustine took to be Christian tenets, but that ardent seeker for the truth was sure that his own constructions were equally unsound. Then were the Sceptics right? It seems clear that Augustine very early anticipated Descartes. Of one thing he was certain: of his own existence, for otherwise how could he be doubting? Then came Plotinus, happily in the Latin of Victorinus, for Augustine could not have tackled that Greek, and probably would never have made the attempt. It is difficult to suppose that any Sceptic would be moved by the daring affirmations of the philosopher, but Augustine was compact of instincts and emotions, together with a passion for reality. Here were unhesitating assertions of real existence, irrefragable because not based on ratiocination, intuitive and fit to be compared with his knowledge of his own real being. I should say that he was rather captivated than convinced. His own subsequent Platonism looked more to the *Timæus*, read in Cicero's translation, than to the *Enneads*.

At this point I take leave to congratulate Dr. Sparrow Simpson on his refusal to be led astray by Alfaric's immense documentation of the varieties of Manichæism. There is a certain unity in them all, notably as antagonistic to Christianity, but in treating of Augustine we are concerned only with the Manichæism of his own time in Africa or at Rome, the Manichæism of the *Fundamentum* or of Faustus. The particularities of Bogomiles or of the Cathari are irrelevant.

The second instrument of conversion, and the more determinant, was Authority. Here again I think Dr. Sparrow Simpson is not quite in touch. He seems to think of the word in some

of its current English senses. *Auctoritas* was a much more precise term, and Augustine used it with precision. In criticizing the Sceptics he observed that most of the knowledge which they dissolved into opinion does not start with any kind of rationalization, but begins with the acceptance of a statement on authority. And *auctoritas* means precisely that which does actually effect conviction, whether moral or intellectual. Its operation may ultimately be analysed and rationalized, but in the first instance it is as direct and immediate as intuition. Its effect may be called belief, assurance, confidence or conviction; and this will produce apparently spontaneous action. Augustine recognized this quality in Jesus Christ long before he was instructed in Christian doctrine, and he makes it plain that he was bewildered by the paralysis of will which prevented him from acting on the dominant influence of which he was conscious. Whence came the new assurance which with startling suddenness released him from that inhibition? From certain glowing words of St. Paul, he seems to tell us. But what drove home the conviction that he could live up to that aspiration? "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof." Why was this possible for his weakness? In writing his Confessions he was concerned more with his reaction to influence than with the nature of that influence. We must look elsewhere for autobiographical supplement.

I think we may find it in something which Dr. Sparrow Simpson, with all his diligence, seems to have overlooked; in a passage written much earlier, when the memory of his conversion was fresh.* It contains a sentence which is often quoted without much perception of its significance: "Ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi me Catholicæ ecclesiæ commoveret *auctoritas*." The word *commoveret* is important; it indicates an emotional or moral influence which is the proper effect of *auctoritas*. We are not to think of what we might call in English the institutional authority of the Church. It is doubtful whether that can ever induce belief; the most that can be so imposed is conformity, and Augustine was not subject to it until after his conversion. The context shows what sort of authority was brought to bear upon him.

He is setting out grounds for ignoring Manichæan arguments against the Christian Faith. "Tenet consensio populorum atque gentium." That would have been less impressive if he had possessed more geographical knowledge, but we find him elsewhere supposing that only some negligible populations still remained outside the ambit of Christianity. At all events, the

* *Contra Ep. Fundamenti*, c. 4.

peoples and tribes that counted were within. Augustine was a true Roman. One may ask whether he was not staggered by evidence of heresy and schism: the Arian Goths beginning to invade the Empire; the preponderance of Donatists in Africa. I think we shall find him reckoning on them as testifying broadly and generally to the truth of the Gospel. He continues: "Tenet auctoritas miraculis inchoata, spe nutrita, caritate aucta, vetustate firmata." Here the moral aspect of the authority is emphasized. The Christian religion works; it began with startling events—we must remember what *miraculum* meant for Augustine—it is full of common humanity, and it has stood the test of time. He continues: "Tenet ab ipsa sede Petri apostoli, cui pascendas oves suas post resurrectionem Dominus commendavit, usque ad præsentem episcopatum successio sacerdotum." Here comes in the institutional note, with a reminiscence of Cyprian, and its warrant of permanence and solidity. "Tenet postremo ipsum Catholicæ nomen." But here he lapses into his worst style of forensic argument, pointing out that even heretics and unbelievers call the building in which orthodox Christians worship the "Catholicæ"—a touch of almost unimaginable sophistry! But we are concerned with the considerations which actually affected Augustine, and we must include even this. "Ista ergo tot et tanta Christiani nominis carissima vincula recte hominem tenent credentem in Catholicæ Ecclesia." Observe again the note of emotion. It was therefore useless to ply him with Manichæan arguments drawn from the Gospel; he would not believe the Gospel itself but as moved by the authority of the Church, and that same authority, now become institutional, forbade surrender to Manichæan arguments.

He was a Roman, with the Roman sense of order and majesty; this majestic spectacle of a world-wide religious order moved him to submission. Such external influence he thus described, for the benefit of outsiders, not long after his submission was made. Nine or ten years afterwards he described, still for the benefit of readers but in converse with God, his interior reaction to the influence imposed.

T. A. LACEY.

BOOK NOTES

Turning Points of General Church History. By Edward L. Cutts. Condensed and revised by W. C. Piercy. S.P.C.K. 6s. It is good to get a new edition of Dr. Cutts' famous work, which in its day must have been the means of arousing an interest in the history of the Church in thousands of fresh minds. To revise the work of another, especially if it is concerned with a number of small details, is not a very pleasant task for most men.

Mr. Piercy has accomplished it in a praiseworthy manner, and in its present form *Turning Points of General Church History*, its youth renewed, should enter upon a career of fresh usefulness. For a study band or an adult Bible Class one could hardly wish for anything better. One word of criticism may perhaps be allowed, inasmuch as the index is rather meagre. I also noticed at least one misprint: Innocent III. on p. 244 is stated to have begun his pontificate in 1178 instead of 1198.

Seekers and Saints. By W. J. Ferrar. S.P.C.K. 6s. This is a charming and discursive collection of philosophical studies. It ranges from Cleanthes, through Cornish Saints and Kings, right down to the Irish literary revival of our own day. The studies are not technical; so that the average reader will find that they present no difficulty to his understanding, and he will be attracted by the clear and pleasing style. The reading of this small volume might well form a landmark in the life of its possessor, since it offers so many possibilities for the cultivation of fresh interests. Mr. Ferrar is to be congratulated on his achievement, and also to be thanked for gathering together these delightful essays in a single volume.

L. E. B.

The Pearl Merchant. By K. E. Maclean. S.P.C.K. 1s. A book of stories for children based on some of our Lord's Parables and some episodes in His Life; the background of Eastern life is woven into the substance of the stories. They are vivid and convincing and would interest children. One wonders how wise it is to elaborate in such detail and embroider with names and episodes culled from imagination and lore and by no means implicit in the original. The appeal of the Gospel story is unique in its simplicity and reserve, and children can appreciate this. A child who reads these stories might henceforth think of our Lord's Parables as a summary of a longer narrative instead of what they are—each a perfect masterpiece.

C. R. N.

More Sermon Outlines : for Holy Days and Holy Week. By M. Donavan. Mowbray. 3s. 6d. A preacher in middle life who publishes outlines of sermons gives hostages to fortune, for in later life he is in danger of being considered a plagiarist when he preaches his own sermons. If Mr. Donavan does not mind this, nothing but good can come from the publication of these admirable outlines, which the clergy can fill out according to their individuality and the needs of their congregations.

The Pathetic Fallacy. By Llewelyn Powys. Longmans. 5s. One is always ready to give a careful hearing to serious arguments against Christianity. But Mr. Powys' beautifully written denunciation of it as an outworn superstition (issued by a well-known publisher of religious books) need not take up our space. He starts from the position that "with the knowledge that we have won in recent years we are safe in asserting that no man has ever risen out of the grave." This life being all, any religion that professes to teach us about the next life must be a delusion. Before we take such a book seriously we expect to have details of the alleged new "knowledge."

W.K.L.C.